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REFERENCESI.  INTRODUCTION
In  1980,  Chile  passed  a  revolutionary  pension  reform.  This  reform  created  a  new
system  based  on  prefunded,  mandatory  contributions  in  personal  accounts  and  on private
management of the funds.  Also, the new pension  system gives those workers  covered by the
scheme the right to choose between  different pension  providers and between  different  forms
of payout after their retirement.
The  1980 reform  is known  as  the "AFP System"'  and  was  one of the many  changes
that gave shape to a new market-oriented  model of economic and social development in Chile,
m  a process  initiated  in  the mid  1970s.  The  close  relationship  between  the  social  security
reform  and  other  economic  reforms  was  made  explicit  by  the  Minister  of Labour  of the
period:  "It is  not possible  to  create  a pension  system  such as  the one  that has been  created
here,  without  being  convinced  at  the  same  time  of the  need  to  found  a  new  strategy  of
economic  and social development, based on the freedom of markets, on the individual and on
the economic  protagonists  that create  wealth.  The social security reform was part of a global
model....which  sought to drastically  reduce the size  of the  State and to eliminate  monopolies,
both in businesses  and in trade unions".2
Chile's  pension reform has generated great interest  among foreign  analysts  and those
who shape  public opinion.  It  has become  an  almost inevitable  reference  in  any  discussion
about different alternatives  ways to overcome the economic effects of an aging population and
to reduce  political  risks  faced  by traditional  social  security  systems  around  the  world.  The
popularity of Chile's particular type of pension reform is probably due to several reasons:
First, the good performance  during  its first years in operation  have lent credibility  to
this innovative reform  and stimulated interest in the system.  The existence of a solution to the
problems  of social security which, in addition to being conceptually attractive, actually works in
practice,  has  served  to  strengthen  the  influence  of those  wishing  to promote  this  type  of
reform.
Also,  Chile's  traditional  pension  system  shared  many  of  the  characteristics  and,
therefore,  many of the problems, of pension systems in other Latin American  countries and in
others  countries  outside  the region.  For these  countries,  the  success  of the Chilean reform
represents hope of an effective  solution to the problems of their own pension programmes.
In fact, the Chilean  reform has been an important reference for reforms in many other
countries.  Thus, so  far,  - apart from Chile  - eight Latin American  countries  (Peru, in  1992;
Colombia and Argentina, in 1993; Uruguay, in  1995; Mexico,  Bolivia and El Salvador in 1996;
Nicaragua  in  2000  and  Dominican  Republic  in  2001)  have  passed  reforms  which  include
l  "AFP" is the abbreviation  of "Administradoras  de Fondos de Pensiones"  (Pension Fund
Management Companies).
2  Pifiera (1991  b, p.137)
2components  of individual  capitalization  and  private  management3.  Outside  Latin  America
there  are the examples  of Croatia,  Hungary, Kazakhstan,  Latvia and Poland, countries  which
have  also introduced  elements  of individual  capitalization  and private  management  into  their
own pension systems.
Third,  although  the  AFP  system  is  an  innovative  solution, that  moves  away  from
traditional  concepts of social  security, it remains  consistent with the principles  that characterize
the market-oriented  economic  development  models  that have  started to prevail in the world,
since  the  collapse of the "real socialisms"  of Eastern  Europe.  At the same  time, the Chilean
case has helped to underline  the importance  of social security reformn in growth  strategies.  In
particular,  the  interaction  between  the process  of  accumulation  of pension  funds  and  the
development  of  capital  markets,  and  the  effect  of these  changes  on  national  saving,  have
aroused great interest.
Finally, during the past few years, various multilateral financial institutions  have begun
to promote  reforms which include some of the  main characteristics  of the AFP system,  and
this has also contributed to its popularity abroad4.
The  aim of this paper is  to describe  the  1980 Chilean pension  reform  and to present
its  main  results  and  economic  impact.  It is  mainly  descriptive;  however  we  have  tried  to
emphasize  the lessons  that may be learned  and that may be of interest  to other  countries  in
different  circumstances.  In  particular,  we  focus  on  potential  areas  for  regulatory
improvements.  In Section II, a brief description of the AFP system and its place within Chile's
social eecurity  system is  presented.  Also,  the  main  characteristics  of the  transition  from  the
"old"  to the new system are sketched, together with the main changes in regulation after 1980.
Section  III  includes  a  history  of  pension  reform  in  Chile  along  with  an  analysis  of the
circumstances  which may explain why the country decided  to introduce such a radical  reform.
In  Section  IV,  the performance  of the  AFP system  is  summarized.  In Section  V, the  main
economic  effects  of pension  reform  are  discussed.  Section VI presents  our view  regarding
future  development  in  the  regulation  of the AFP  system.  The  paper  concludes  with  some
comments on the timing of possible regulatory changes.
II.  THE REFORM OF 1980
11.1  Characteristics of the AFP system
The  AFP  system  commenced  operations  in  May  1981.  The  most  fundamental
characteristics  of  the  system  are:  (i)  contributions  are  capitalized  in  individual  (personal)
accounts  (the rate  of contribution  is defined  in the law  as a proportion  of the wage),  (ii) the
value of old-age  pensions depend on the balance  accumulated in the personal account of each
worker  (iii)  while  disability  and  survivorship  pensions  are  "defined  benefits"  with  a  value
proportional  to  the  taxable  wage  of the  member,  (iv)  the  worker  is  free  to  choose  among
3  For  a review  of pension  reforms  in Latin America,  see Queisser  (1998)  and Devesa-Carpio  and
Vidal-Melia  (2001).
4  See The World Bank (1994).
3different registered,  single-purpose,  pension management  institutions (the AFPs),  (v) AFPs are
private  and competitive  firms whose  purpose  is  to invest the  funds in  the capital  market  on
behalf of its members,  (vi)  at retirement  the worker can choose among three different ways in
which  he  can  receive  the  pension,  (vii)  and  the  State  plays  mainly  a  "subsidiary  role",
manifested  in  its  responsibility  to  regulate  and  supervise  the  system,  finance  minimum
pensions and provide certain guarantees.
a) Benefits
The AFP system  offers  pensions for old age,  common disability and death (known  as
survivorship) and a single funeral grant.  5  6
Old age pensions
The amount of old-age pensions  depends on the balance accumulated in each worker's
personal account;  life  expectancy  and that of the beneficiaries;  and on the discount  rate.  In
order  to be  entitled to  this  benefit,  a man must be  65  years  old while  a woman must be  60
years  old.  However, the worker may ask for "anticipated old-age pension" if the balance in her
individual account allows her to finance  a pension greater  than 50%  of her average wage and
greater than  110%  of the minimum pension guaranteed by the State7.
Differences in the age requirements for men and women have been questioned on two
grounds.  First,  they  have  an  impact  on the  relative  levels  of pensions  which,  on  average,
should be lower for women because  they retire  earlier  and  have a greater life-expectancy  (In
Chile, mortality  tables  used by the AFPs  to  calculate  scheduled  withdrawals  and by the life-
insurance companies to offer life annuities,  are differentiated by sex.  Thus at 60 years of age,
life expectancy  of a  womnan is 23.8 years,  whereas it is  19.8 years  for a man)8. Second, as  the
participation  of  women  in  the  labor  market  increases,  government  expects  expenses  in
minimum pensions to increase. Although these critiques  have not yet lead to specific proposals
of changes in regulation, it is possible that retirement ages for women will be increased in the
future.
Disabilih  and surviorship  pensions
All contributing members who are not retired and members who are unemployed for a
period  of up  to  twelve  months,  are  entitled  to  disability  insurance  in  case  of "non-labor"
related accident or illness  (Disability or death  as a result of a labor accident or work-related
5  The value  of this  funeral  grant is  UF  15 (equivalent  to US$364 as  of August 2001).  The person
who  can provide  proof of having taken  charge of the funeral  expenses  is entitled  to this  benefit,
regardless  of  whether  he  or  she  is  related  to  the  deceased  member  by  marriage  or  family
relationship.
6  The AFPs  also manage  voluntary  savings  accounts  and  compensation  accounts  in  the  event  of
dismissal.
7  An increase  in  this requirement  to  150%  of the minimum pension  is at present passing  through
the legislative process.
8  There are no official statistics available of pension amounts classified by sex.
4illness are covered by a different  social security programme - which is managed by the "Mutual
de Seguridad").
Disability  pensions  may  be  partial  or  total.  The  worker  who  suffers  a  loss in  his
working capacity that is greater than, or equal to 50%, and less than two-thirds, may be entitled
to  a  partial  disability  pension;  in order  to  be  registered  as  totally  disabled,  the  loss must  be
greater  than  or  equal  to  two-thirds  of  working  capacity.  A  medical  board  from  the
Superintendency of AFPs has to evaluate the situation of the worker and issue a first disability
report.  This report is checked three years later, and on that occasion a second verdict is issued,
which  may  definitively  confirm  the  disability,  modify  its  degree  from partial  to total or vice
versa, or reject it ghe worker begins to receive  the pension when it is first reported).
Survivorship  pensions  are  received  by  the  surviving  spouse9,  legitimate,  biological
adopted  children  and the  mother  of the biological  children.  If there  are no beneficiaries  in
these categories,  entitlement passes to the parents of the deceased member.
The law defines disability and survivorship benefits as a percentage of the "base wage",
which  is  an average  of the wages  received  by the  deceased  member  over the  past ten years,
updated by the change in the Consumer Price Index during this period.
Minimum pensions
Members  of the AFP  system who  fulfil certain requirements  are entitled to minimum
old-age,  disability  and  survivorship  pensions  which  are  guaranteed  by  the  State.  This
programme  of minimum pensions represents  the "first pillar" of Chile's pension system and is
described in Section 11.2 bellow.
Payout altematives'°
AFP  members  receive  the  benefits  in  the  form  of pensions  and not  in  lump  sums,
except  when  they  have  accumulated  enough  funds  in  their  personal  accounts  to  finance
pensions greater than 70% of the average of their taxable wages  for the previous ten years and
120%  of the minimum  pension.  In  this  case,  they may  withdraw  in  a  single  payment  the
capital in excess of what is needed to finance such a pension.
All pensioners  may freely choose between three pension modes:  scheduled withdrawal;
life  annuity;  and temporary  income with deferred  life annuity".  Pensions, under all of these
alternatives,  are indexed to prices'2. In the case of scheduled withdrawal,  the worker keeps his
funds in the  personal AFP account  and withdraws  annually  (in monthly quotas)  the amount
9  In order to be the pension beneficiary,  the surviving widower must be disabled.
10  For a detailed description,  see Palacios and Rofman (2001).
11  There is are restriction to buy life annuities: this is that the value the annuity can not be lower than
the minimum  pension which is guaranteed  by the State.
12  Almost all financial  assets  (debt) with  a maturity period longer than 90 days which are traded in
chilean capital markets  are indexed  to the price index.
5resulting from dividing the accumulated balance  by the capital required'3 to pay a pension unit
to  the member,  and when  he  dies,  to the  beneficiaries.  The  annual  amount  is  recalculated
every  twelve  months  and  the  value  varies  according  to  the  investment  return  of  the
accumulated  funds,  the  life  expectancies  of  the  member  and  his  family  group,  and  the
withdrawals  that have been made.
Life  annuities  are  sold  by  life  insurance  companies.  Workers  can  choose  among
different  companies  and  will  receive  a  monthly  income  until  they  die.  Afterwards,  the
company  will pay  survivorship  pensions  to  their  beneficiaries.  When  a worker  buys  a  life
annuity he transfers  the financial  risks attached both to longevity and the rate of return to the
life insurance company.  The contract is irrevocable.
When choosing temporary income with a deferred life annuity, the member enters into
a contract with a life insurance  company that will pay her a  life annuity  as  from some future
date, after the time of actual retirement.  Between the date of retirement and the date on which
she begins  to  receive  the  life annuity,  the member receives  a monthly  pension  financed with
funds held specifically  for this purpose in the personal AFP account.
b) Financing  of  benefits
The contribution rate  for the old age,  disability and survivorship  program managed by
the AFPs is 1  0% of the wage (maximum taxable wage is UF 6014) and is charged  to the worker.
The employer will deduct the contributions  from the worker's wages and will deposit it in the
AFP where the worker has his personal account; at retirement  the accumulated balance in this
account,  plus  the  Recognition  Bond  (see  II.1  (c)  below),  where  applicable,  finance  the
pensions.
Disability  and survivorship  pensions  are also financed by a collective insurance  policy
taken out by each AFP with a life insurance  company (that they select).  When a worker who is
covered  by the contract becomes  disabled or dies,  the insurance  company  has to deposit an
amount  (called  "Additional Contribution")  into his/her personal account.  This  amount must
be equal to the difference between  the capital needed to finance the legally prescribed  level of
pensions  and  the  balance  accumulated  in  the personal  account of the worker at the time  of
disability or death.
In addition  to  the  10%  contribution,  workers  must  pay  insurance  and management
charges to the AFPs.  These are used to finance the disability and survivorship  insurance and
AFPs expenses and profits.  As of June 2001,  the average  combined value of these charges was
2.3%  of the wage.  Of this total,  disability and survivorship insurance premium represented  80
basis points. Since insurance  and management  charges must be the same percentage  rate for all
members  of an AFP (with the exception  of pensioners,  who are not entitled to the insurance,
13  The  discount  rate  used  to  calculate  the  necessary  capital  is  a  weighted  average  of the  average
interest-rate  implied in  the life annuities  sold by  the insurance  companies  (80%)  and the rate of
return  on the pension funds managed by the AFPs (20%).  The appropriateness  of this formula is
currently being discussed.
4  U$1,455, approximately,  as of August 2001.
6and  self-employed  workers"5)  and  are  mainly  set  as  a  percentage  of the  wage  level  of the
member,  there  are  cross  subsidies  between  members  of an AFP  - for  example,  from  high
earners to low earners and between men and women (who have  a higher life-expectancy).)
Members of the system may also make voluntary contributions up to a maxmurm limit,
which are not subject to income tax, in order to increase the level of benefits or bring forward
their retirement age."
c) The Recogniiion Bond
The Recognition  Bond  (RB)  is a document expressed in monetary values, representing
the  periods  of  contributions  that  workers  who  changed  to  the  AFP  system  had  already
registered  under  the old  pension  system." 8 The value  of the  RB  is  calculated  as  the  capital
needed  in order  for the member to  receive, at the normnal  retirement age, a pension  equal to
80% of the taxable wages he received between 30h June 1978 and 30h June 1979, multiplied by
the  proportion  of his/her  active  life  during which  he  paid  into  the  old  system  (assuming,
however  that  the  total  contribution  period was  35  years).  There  is  a  differentiation  in this
calculation  between men and women and depending on the age of the worker.  This amount is
adjusted  automatically  for  inflation  and is  capitalized  at a  rate of 4%  per year in  real terms.
The  RBs are guaranteed  by the state and are paid when the member retires  (at that point the
corresponding amount is paid into the worker's personal account).' 9
The RB changed the profile  of payments  of the debt of the accrued pension liabilities
pension  system  since it transformed  a flow  of pensions paid out over  time into a value  to be
paid out at one given moment.  Also, and because of the formula  used to estimate its value, it
may benefit some workers more than others.  In general, all those workers who were members
of Cajas de Previsi6n which offered replacement rates of less than 80%, and those who have a
life annuity factor that is higher than the market factor (since when they retire they will receive
a RB which will allow them to buy a life annuity of more than the 80% contemplated  in the RB
calculation)20, will benefit from  the methodology  applied  for the recognition  of rights accrued
in the old system.  Those who were in  Cajas de Previsi6n which offered replacement  rates of
over  8 0%  and those who were in Cajas that required less than 35 years'  contributions,  do not
benefit.  In sum, the total spending generated by the RB will be different than the expenditure
on pensions  that would have been paid  to these  same workers in  a scenario without reform,
but the direction and magnitude of this difference have not been calculated.  Since there are no
"  At present the AFPs  charge the  same insurance  and management  charges  to employed and  self-
employed workers, but lower rates to contributors who are not entitled to insurance.
16  See Valdes and Navarro (1992).
17  The  upper  limit  for  voluntary  contributions  which  are  not  liable  for  income  tax  is  UF  60
(US$1,455) less the contributions for pensions  (100%  of wages), health (7%)  and the insurance and
management  charges on taxable wage paid to the AFP (so, monthly voluntary contributions  could
reach a maximum value of approximately  UF48 or US$1,164).
18  See D.L.3.500  Chapter XV, Art.  3 to 12.
19  However, workers who want to anticipate  their old age pension  are authorized to trade the RB on
the stock exchanges  or, if they buy a life annuity,  sell it to the insurance company.
2C'  See Marcel and Arenas (1999).
7estimates of the magnitude  of this effect, it is not known if the reform did reduce  or increase
the present value  future stream of deficits that were growing at that time.
d) Pension  fund  investnents
Existing regulations  mandate AFPs to offer two types of pension funds to its members.
"Type  1" Pension Fund may be invested in fixed income instruments  and stocks, whilst "Type
2" Pension Fund must be placed exclusively in fixed income  securities  and its investments  are
subject  to a maximum weighted  average term. The  only members allowed to invest in Type 2
Pension Fund are those declared disabled by  a first decision of the Medical  Board, pensioners
under  the  scheduled  withdrawal  or temporary  income  plans,  and  those  close  to retirement
(which  are  defined  as men who are  55 years  of age or more and women who are 50 years of
age or more).
Within  each  type of Fund,  investments  are  strictly  regulated.  Regulations  include  a
wide  variety  of quantitative  limits.  For  example,  the  law  defines  the instruments  that  are
authorized  for  pension  funds  investments  and  sets  maximum  investment  limits  (as  a
percentage  of the pension  funds)  by instruments,  groups of instruments,  issuers  and persons
related to the fund-management  company.  Investment procedures are also regulated.  The law
makes it mandatory  for trading to be carried out in authorized secondary markets and primary
markets  that have certain characteristics.  Regulation makes  also mandatory  that the valuation
of investments must be carried out at market prices, which are equal for all the AFPs, and are
estimated by the Superintendency.  It requires that custody of financial instruments be carried
out in authorized  institutions  and sets  up a  Risk  Rating  Cornmission  with responsibility  to
approve  or reject  the instruments  which  might be investment  opportunities  for the pension
funds and to assign risk categories to fixed income securities, which influence maximum limits
as far as investment of the funds is concerned  (see Table 1).
Although  it  is  possible  that  most  of  investment  risk  could  be  controlled  with  a
combination  of strict  supervision  and regulations  that ensure  the  transparency  of operations
and  control  for  potential  conflicts  of interest,  at  the  time  the  reform  began,  supervisory
capacity was relatively low and, also, as we have already mentioned, there was  a certain degree
of suspicion regarding the ability of the financial sector to manage social security resources.  As
a result, the decision was made to opt for quantitative  limits.  This particular form of regulation
has proven effective as far as guaranteeing the safety of the funds is concerned, but it may have
reduced risk-adjusted returns21.
e) Management
The  AFPs  are  private  companies  with  a very  limnited  corporate  objective.  The  law
allows  them  to manage  the  personal  pension  accounts  of members,  voluntary  savings  and
compensation  accounts  and invest  the  assets  accumulated  in  those  accounts".  Regulations
21  See Srinivas and Yermo (1999)  and the reply by Valdes (2000).
22  Voluntary  savings  accounts have  immediate  liquidity;  the  advantage of being  deducted  from  the
payroll; and are subject to the same tax conditions  as other forms of savings, except in cases where
8also  allow  them  to  provide  consultancy  services  abroad  on  pension  fund  management;  to
participate  in the  ownership  of fund-management  companies  in  other  countries  and  in the
ownership  of companies  which provide  services  to the AFP system in  Chile, like the  Central
Securities Deposit and  a company which collects  social security contributions,  but the volume
of assets  that  may  be  reserved  to  these  activities  is  limited.  On  the  other hand,  the  law
demands  that pension  fund  assets  and  those  of the  fund-management  company  be  totally
separate  from both the legal and accounting  points of view.  AFPs  operate  on a competitive
basis and workers  are free  to choose their pension  fund management  company and to change
to a different one, up to twice a year.
Regulations  allow  free  entry  into the  industry,  but  require  minimum  capital  of UF
10,000  for  an  AFP  with  5,000  members,  rising  to  UF  20,000  when  the  AFP  reaches  a
membership  of  10,000.'  Because  of a  provision  in  the  Banking  Law,  banks  may  not  be
shareholders  in pension fund-management companies.  There are no restrictions  regarding the
participation  of foreign investors as owners of AFP's and there is no state-owned AFP.
Regulations  also  oblige AFPs to guarantee  a minimum return  for each of their  funds.
This minimum return is equal to the lower of two values:  the real average  annual return of all
pension funds of the same type during the past 36 months,  rninus 2 percentage points, or 50%
of the  absolute  value  of that return.  To cover  this  guarantee,  the  law  obliges  the AFPs  to
constitute a Reserve  for Variations of Return, made up of the excess in returns obtained  by the
AFPs  over and  above  a maximum  established  in the  regulations2 4,  and to keep  a  Mandatory
Reserve  ("Encaje") which belongs to the shareholders  of the fund-management  company and
must be equivalent to at least 1% of the value of pension fund assets.
Many  observers  of the AFP  system  argue that  the  existence  of the  minimum return
provokes  a  "herd-effect"  in the  AFP system but,  in our  opinion,  this effect may  be more  a
consequence  of  the  existence  of a  single  benchmark  in  the  system  as  described  below  in
Section VI.3.
The AFPs may impose management charges on the depositing of regular contributions,
on the transfer of the balance in the account from another fund-management  company and on
payments of temporary  income and scheduled  withdrawals.  Charges on regular  contributions
may be  a  percentage  of the wage,  a  fixed  sum  or  a  combination  of the  two.  Charges  on
withdrawals  and account transfers  may be a percentage of the values involved,  a fixed sum per
operation or a combination of both  (see Table 2).  The AFPs may also charge a fixed sum for
such funds are  transferred to  the personal pension account,  in which case returns  are not subject
to income tax.
Employers  contribute  to  compensation  accounts  on  their  workers'  behalf,  and  workers  may
withdraw funds  from these  accounts in the  event of dismissal  or voluntary withdrawal  from the
job.
23  As of August,  2001,  UF 10,000  was equivalent to US$ 242,438 and UF 20,000 was equivalent to
US$ 484,877.
24  The real average annual investment return of all  funds of the same type during the past 36 months,
plus  two percentage points  or plus the absolute value of 50%  of such average  return, whichever
value is greater.
9withdrawals  from  the voluntary  savings  accounts  and a percentage  of the  contributions  paid
into the compensation  accounts.
The AFPs may fix the level  of each  of these charges  freely,  but they must be applied
equally  to  all  members  belonging  to  the  same  fund,  except  in  the  case  of self-employed
workers and members without the right to disability and survivorship insurance, who may have
differentiated charges.
1) Role of  the State
As  we  have  explained,  the  state  finances  the  first  pillar  of  the  pension  system
(minimum pensions).  Its two other  main functions  are to provide  some guarantees  over the
results of the AFP system and to regulate and supervise  it25.
State guarantees
The State  guarantees  the payment  of the Additional  Contributions  (see  Section  II.lb
above) and 100% of the life annuities paid by the insurance companies  (in case of bankruptcy),
up  to  the  amount  of the  minimum  pension,  and  75%  of the  excess  over  and  above  that
amount and up to UF 4526.  It also guarantees  the payment of disability pensions arising from a
first  (medical)  report;  the funeral  grant for funeral expenses;  and  the minimum return  (if the
AFP goes bankrupt).
Supervision and regulation27
Responsibility  for supervision  is given to a specialized  institution, the Superintendency
of AFPs,  which  is  financed  with  funds  from  the  public  budget  and  coordinates  with  the
government  through  the Ministry  of Labour  and  Social  Security.  The total annual  expenses
involved in supervision  are approximately  US$  5.3 million  (0.015%  of pension  fund assets  or
0,2%  of annual  contributions);  almost  70%  of that  sum  is  used to  pay  the  wages  of the
institution's  134 employees.  The Superintendent  is appointed by the President of the Republic
and may be removed  by him at any time  (in twenty years  of history of the ARP  system, there
have been four Superintendents).
The Superintendency  is  organized  in five Divisions and two Sections,  all  of which  are
answerable  to the  Superintendent.  Three  Divisions  are  directly responsible  for supervision-
the  Institutional  Control  Division,  the  Finance  Division  and  the  Benefits  and  Insurance
Division-  and  the  other  two  - the  Research  Division  and  the  Internal  Administration  and
Computing Division- give operational and technical support.
The  main  functions  of  the  Institutional  Control  Division  are  to  supervise  the
management  of personal accounts,  compliance with standards of publicity and information  to
25  The State is also responsible for managing the pension programmes  of the old system, welfare pensions
and the pension programmes of the Armed Forces, which are outside the AFP system.  See Section 11.2.
26  As of August 2001,  UF 45 were equivalent to U$ 1.091.
27  See www.safp.cl
10members,  and  intervention  in  the  processes  of  dissolution  and  liquidation  of  fund-
management  companies.  The  Finance  Division  controls  compliance  with  rules  relating  to
investment of pension  fund resources, supervises AFPs regarding preparation and presentation
of  balance  sheets  (both  of the  AFPs  and pension  funds),  reserve  requirements,  minimum
capital, and  the value of the accounting unit of the pension funds.
The  Benefits  and  Insurance  Division  supervises  the process  of granting  benefits  to
members  and  their beneficiaries,  and the  disability  and survivorship insurance  that the AFPs
must  take  out  with  the  insurance  companies.  The  Research  Division  is  responsible  for
evaluating  and forecasting the functioning of the system and in general,  for carrying out all the
studies  related  with  the  pension  system  that  the  Superintendency  may  require  in  financial,
economic and actuarial matters.
The  task  of the Internal  Administration  and  IT Division is to  design  and adrmiinister
computational support for the inspection  processes,  and for the operations carried out by the
remaining  divisions  of the  Superintendency.  This  includes  links  with  the  AFPs  and with
capital  market  institutions,  both  domestic  and  intemational.  As  regards  the  Intemal
Administration  Department, its job is to take general  charge of the operational  management of
the service in areas such as the control of budget, accounting,  acquisitions and the general file.
The  Medical  Commissions  Section  is  responsible  for  checking  compliance  with
legislation  as  regards  the process  of assessment  of disability  by the  Medical  Commissions.  It
also  regulates  discrepancies  in  criteria  that may  arise  in  applying  the rules  for assessing  and
evaluating the degree of disability between Regional and Central Commissions.  The main tasks
of the Legal Section are to study, analyze  and solve any legal matters falling within the terms of
reference  of the Superintendency;  to take part in creating rules, instructions  and circulars  to be
issued  to  the  individuals  and  fund-management  companies  that  have  been  inspected;  to
propose necessary  reforms  to the  law and  regulations,  and to  apply reprimands  and  fines  to
fund-managers  which do not comply with the regulations currently in force.
11.2  The AIFP system as part of Chile's  social security programs
Chilean  social  security  system  includes  programmes  for  contributory  and  non-
contributory  pensions;  health  and maternity;  labor  accidents  and  professional  illness;  family
and welfare  benefits  (see  Table  3).  Many of these  programmes  were  reformed  in the  1970s
and 1980s.
At -least four different pension programmes  (besides the AFP system)  can be identified.
First,  the  pension  programmes  of  the  old  system,  run  by  the  Institute  of  Social  Security
Normalization  (INP);  second,  the  minimum  pension  program;  third,  the  welfare  pension
program  (these last two programs  are the "first pillar" of the pension system); and, finally,  the
pension programmes of the Armed Forces.a)  The pension  programmes of the old system
Before  1980, management of the "old" or traditional pension programs was fragmented in
more than  30 different  institutions28 but the  expected  development  and growth  of the AFP
system  and the  resulting  fall  in  the  number  of affiliates  in  the  "old"  or traditional  pension
system, made this  organization unsustainable.  In  1980, the institutions  that were running the
different pension programs  of the "old"  system were merged into one single entity,  the INP.
At the present time, the INP still continues to manage the pension programmes of the workers
who  decided  to remain  in  the old  system  instead of joining the AFPs  (which  means  that it
receives  the  respective  contributions  and  pays  the  pensions  of these  workers).  There  are
224.960 contributors  and 843.259 pensioners in  these pension  programmes.  Also,  the INP is
responsible  for calculating  and issuing the Recognition  Bonds of workers who  transferred  to
the AFP system and are entitled to this benefit (see Section II.1.c).  Since January 1993, all new
workers  entering  the  labour  force  must  become  members  of an  AFP,  so  these  particular
functions of the INP are transitory and will come to an end when the last pensions are paid to
the workers who  did not change  to the AFP  system and when  the last  Recognition  Bond is
paid.
The INP also manages other social  security programs  including:  i) labor  accidents and
work-related  illnesses  protection  for  workers  whose  employers  are  not  members  of  the
"Mutuales  de Seguridad"  (institutions  set up to provide  medical  and other services  in case of
accidents  in  the  work-place  and  labour  related  illnesses);  ii)  welfare  (or  "mean  tested")
pensions; iii)  two different  family allowance programs; iv)  unemployment  allowance  (which  is
not an unemployment insurance);  and, v) other benefits established by special laws such as the
Coal-Miners'  Compensation  Law.  In  addition,  the  INP  collects  health  contributions  from
workers  belonging to the public health  system.
b) Minimum and  welfare pensions
Minimum pensions are part of the "first pillar"  of the pension  system and have existed
in Chilean  social security legislation since  1952.  Initially, this benefit was  offered only to blue-
collar  old-age  pensioners  in  the  private  sector;  then,  in  1963  a  programme  of minimum
pensions  was  established  for old-age,  disability  and survivorship  for employees  in the public
and private sector;  and, in  1974 the discrepancies  between white and blue-collar workers were
eliminated.
The  1980  social security  reform granted the right to a minimum old age pension to all
mnembers  of the AFP  system who, at retirement,  have not accumulated enough funds in their
personal  accounts  to finance  a pension  of an amount equal to or greater  than the  minimum
pension,  and  who  fulfill  certain  requirements  as  specified  by  law.  The  State  assumes
responsibility  for the  payment  of this  pension  once  the  funds  in  the personal  accounts  are
exhausted.  Minimum  disability  and  survivorship  pensions  are  also  offered  to workers  who
meet  certain  conditions.  The  value  of  the  minimum  pension  is  fixed  by  law  and  the
expenditure is financed from the central government  budget (see Table 4).
28  See Cheyre (1991).
12The  welfare  (or  "mean  tested")  pension  programmne  was  set  up  in  1975.  It grants
pensions  to  those  people  over  65  years  of age  and to disabled  persons,  provided  that their
income  is  lower than  50%  of the minimum  pension.  The  mninimum  amount of the  welfare
pension is approximately  a third of the minimum pension and this benefit is incompatible  with
receipt of any other pension.29
c) Pensions  for the Armed Forces
The social security programmes  for the Armed Forces were left out of the reforms and
their administration  remained under the responsibility of the National Defense  Social Security
Fund  (CAPREDENA)  and  the  General  Department of Social  Security  for the  Police  Force
(DIPRECA).  The pension  system  for  the  Armed  Forces  runs  at  a deficit  and  benefits  are
financed almost totally by the central government  budget (in 1997 budget contributions  to the
system covered 93% of expenditure  in pensions in CAPREDENA and 95% in DIPRECA).  30
The  Armed  Forces  were  excluded  from  the  AFP  system  mainly  due  to  political
reasons.  In  fact,  although  at the  time of the  reform  some  members  of the Armed  Forces
pointed  out  that  it  was  not  advisable  for  private  companies  to  handle  information  about
military  personnel,  and  that  the  characteristics  of the  military life  presupposed  requirements
different  from a civilian pension  system,  particularly with regard to disability, survivorship  and
retirement conditions,  the team heading up the reform effort felt that it was possible to find a
technically  satisfactory solution to each one of these problems.3
II.3  The transition to the new pension system
The  transition  from  the  old  pension  system  to  the  AFP  system  meant  solving  two
inportant problems  besides  the financing  of the transitional deficit  (on this,  see section  V.1).
A  first,  urgent  and  short  term  problem  was  how  to  persuade  the  workers  who  were
contributing under  the old system  to transfer  to the new AFP system.  A  second, more long
term  problem,  was  how  to  handle  the  winding  down  of the programmes  that  were  being
replaced.
a)  Transfer ofmembers  to the AFP system
As written in Jose Piiiera's  account of pension reform,  for political reasons it was not
possible to oblige those who were already incorporated into the old pension  system to change
to the new AFP system.32 As  a result, it was decided  that affiliation should be mandatory only
for  those  workers  who  started  working  for  the  first  time  after  1'" January  1983,  so
incorporation into the new system was left on a voluntary basis for workers who had begun to
29  See Novoa (1977).
30  De la Cerda  (1997, p.231).
}l  Pifiera (1991  a, p.31).  Recently discussions  started regarding the future of the pension program for
the Armed  Forces  and there  are  some proposals to introduce  a finded system based in personal
accounts for this sector.
32  Pifiera (1991a, pp.20-21).
13work before that date and for the self-employed.  This meant accepting  a prolonged transition
period, which will  continue until the old system pays out the last pension to the last of the its
pensioners  (approximately 50 years after pension reform was started in 1980).
In any case, the  change of workers  to the new system was  encouraged  by an intensive
communications  campaign.  In  addition,  there  was  a  strong  incentive  to  transfer,  because
contribution  rates  for those who remained under the old system were on average  30%  higher
than the rates paid by those who changed to the AFP system.  This allowed those who opted
for this latter group to obtain a significant increase in their net (of taxes) wage, because another
law made  the  worker himself responsible  for a large  part of his  social security  contributions
and  increased  his  wage  in  proportion  to  the  contributions  that  were  in  force  prior  to  the
reform33.
Together with this, the Recognition Bond was set up to recognize the "debt" which the
old system had with the workers  who decided to change  to the AFP system.  Thus those who
chose the AFP system were able to replace pension promises made under the old system with
a  document  with  a  state  guarantee  that  proves  an  economic  right  on  their  behalf  This
represented yet another incentive for the transfer of workers to the new system.
To  summanize,  the  combined  effect  of  lack  of confidence  in  the  old  system;  the
attraction  that  many  workers  felt  for  a  new  system  which  offered  hitherto  unknown
possibilities;  the  increase  in  wages  for  those  who  changed  over;  and  the  security  of the
Recognition  Bond,  all  served to make  the process of transferring workers to the AFP system
extraordinarily  rapid.  So, in  only eight months,  65% of the  total number  of civilian  workers
covered  by mandatory  pension programmes  had transferred to the AFP system. By the end of
1983 this figure reached 77%  (see Table  2)34.
b) Adjustmnents to the oldpension system
The  creation of the AFP  system was  the second phase in a process  of social security
reforms  that  had  begun  much  earlier  and  that  was  primarily  aimed  at  rationalizing  the
operation  of the programmes  of the old system and improving their financial position.
In  1974 the  differences  in  the  level of mninimum  pensions  of the  different  "Cajas  de
Previsi6n"  were  eliminated  and  welfare  pensions  were  introduced  for  those  elderly  and
disabled persons without resources of their own.  That same year,  contribution  rates began to
be reduced in most of the "Cajas", reaching levels of a little more than 20%  (pensions) in 1980.
In order to tackle evasion, the "declaration without payment of contributions"  mechanism was
introduced  in  1976, reducing  sanctions  and fines  for the employer  who put in a declaration,
though  without  paying,  as  compared  with  one  who  neither  declared  nor  paid.  Special
33  See D.L. 3,501  and Arellano  (1981, pp. 9-11). The effect was not the same for all workers,  because
each of the social security institutions  under the old system had a different contribution rate.
34  It should  be  noted  however,  that  the  "switching"  process  varied  by  age  cohort,  with  younger
workers  transferring  more  frequently  than  older  ones.  This  phenomenon  would  be  expected
when  a  backloaded  defined  benefit  scheme  is  replaced  by  a  defined  contribution  scheme  as
described in Palacios  and Whitehouse  (1998).
14exemptions  were  also  introduced  for  arrangements  to  pay  social  security  debts  that  were
declared within certain deadlines.  In 1978, the updating of contributors'  individual records was
begun (for example the Private  Employees'  "Caja"  had ceased  updating accounts  from 1967
onwards).  In 1979, age requirements  for entitlement to old-age pensions under different social
security  schemes were  standardized, with minimum ages of 65 years for men and 60 years  for
women  being decided  upon  (these  are  the same  ages as  those  currently in  force in  the AFP
system)35. Pensions for seniority  and "matched" pensions  were also  eliminated;  an automatic
readjustment mechanism was created to keep pace with inflation; and a minimum period of 10
years' contributions was established for entitlement to an old-age pension.  In addition, during
this period, benefits  for dismissal and compensation for years of service, which were included
m most of the old social security  schemes, were  also eliminated  on the grounds  that coverage
for  these  eventualities  corresponded  to  labour  legislation.  Finally,  in  1980  the  Instituto  de
Normalizaci6n Previsional  (see Section 11.2) was set up36.
II.4  Later reforms
The  regulation  of the  AFP  system  has  undergone  numerous  changes  since  1980.
Between  1981  and  1996,  412  modifications  to  the  main  law  of  the  AFP  system  were
introduced,  by means of 33  different  laws.  In the period between  1981  and March 1990,  the
date  on which  the military  government  came to an end, there  were  301  modifications  of the
main  law,  by means of 22 laws.  Since  that date and up to  1996,  a  further  111  modifications
have  been  made  by  means  of  11  laws.  Between  1997  and 2000,  a  further  three  laws  were
passed  to  modify the  legal  framework  of the  pension  system.  Finally,  in September  2001,
Congress accepted  a new draft law that introduce new changes  to AFP main law.  In addition,
a large  number  of modifications  have  been made  to  secondary  regulations  that complement,
interpret or make the aforementioned  main law more specific37.
The aim of these changes has been to fine-tune  the specific  design of the system and to
date its  fundamental  characteristics  have not been  changed.  Most of the legal modifications
carried out between  1981 and 2001 refer to the regulation of pension fund investments and the
rules for benefits.
Regarding investment regulations, the main objectives  of the changes have been:
i)  To ensure that there are enough investment alternatives  for the pension funds, in order
to avoid excessive concentration in certain instruments and issuers (see Table 1).
ii)  To  introduce  the  concept  of  individual  and  portfolio  risk  and  allow  the  use  of
instruments for hedging financial risks.
iii)  To  improve  the  definition  and  control  of  potential  conflicts  of  interest  in  the
management of pension  funds.
3  D.L.  2,448.  The adjustment was gradual,  depending on the  age of the worker and the number  of
years he/she had been contributing  (see Gaete, 1997).
36  D.L3,502.
37  See Borchers  (1997).
15iv)  To increase  the investment altematives  available  to members  for both mandatory  and
voluntary saving.
Although  the  process  of improving  pension  fund  investment  regulation  has  been
continuous,  it  is  obvious  that  the  most  important  reforms  have  occurred  in  cycles  of
approximately  four to five years:  1981;  1985;  1989-90;  1994;  and 1999-2001.  At present,  the
Congress is discussing various draft laws presented by the President of the Republic to modify
investment rules  once again,  and the government has  recently announced  new initiatives with
the same  aim.  The changes include  an increase in the maximum  limit for investment abroad;
the creation of a  system of multiple  funds (the AFPs will offer their members  five investment
portfolios, which will be differentiated  by the percentage  of their investment held in stocks);
and more room to invest in local holding companies.
Regarding  the  regulation  of benefits,  most of the modifications  were  made  between
1981  and  1984 and  between  1987  and  1990.  Some of the more outstanding of these are the
greater  facility  for  early  retirement;  the  widening  of coverage  in  the  case  of disability  and
survivorship insurance  (to include the unemnployed and pardally disabled); the improvement in
the process for qualifying as disabled (standardization  of norms; the introduction of the second
verdict)  and the introduction of a mandatory  tendering  process  for contracting  disability and
survivorship  insurance;  the  creation  of voluntary  savings  and  compensation  accounts;  the
establishment of a new  pension modality  (temporary  income with  deferred  life  annuity);  and
change  in  the  way  in  which  the  insurance  companies  pay  the  disability  and  survivorship
insurance,  which  introduced  the  concept  of "Additional  Contribution"  and  opened  up  the
possibility  for  members  and  their  beneficiaries  to  decide  between  the  other  two  pension
modalities, in addition to that of life annuities.
Also, in 1983,  to ensure  competition  and reduce the entry barriers to the industry, the
"mandatory  reserve"  requirement  that  has  to  be  held  by  the AFPs  to  guarantee  minimum
return was reduced  from 5%  to  1% of the pension fund.  In 1985, the rules governing  fund-
managers'  charges  were modified to  simplify  their  structure  and the  authorization  to  charge
fixed and percentage  fees for managing personal account balances was withdrawn.
Finally,  significant  changes  have  been  made  in  the rules  regarding  transfers  between
AFPs, by means  of by-laws  issued  by the Superintendency  of AFPs.  In  1982, workers were
obliged to sign  affiliation and transfer applications  at a branch office of the selected AFP; in
1983, AFPs were instructed to keep a book  of affiliations  and transfers  in  all their branches,
this to be registered and  stamped by the Superintendency  and not removed  from  the branch
premises  (in order to ensure  that workers  actually  went to the  agency themselves).  Later,  in
1987, the requirements  regarding the use of the book and actual presence at the agencies were
repealed.  In  1997,  an obligation  was introduced which involved  attaching photocopies  of the
I.D. card and the latest account statement  to the  transfer application.  After this last change a
considerable reduction occurred in the number of sales agents and the number of transfers.
16III. THE DECISION FOR THE AFP SYSTEM
111.1  Fore-runners of pension  reform
The  pension  reform  of  1980  has  two  main  fore-runners:  the  project  -known  as  El
Ladrillo (The Brick) - prepared by  a group of economists  linked to the Catholic  University  of
Chile, who began working in  1972  on an economic programme inspired by the ideas of a free
market as an alternative  to what was being applied in Chile at that time under the government
of socialist  president  Salvador  Allende,  and  the work  carried  out in  Odeplan  (the  National
Planning Office) between  1974 and 1977 under the leadership of Mviguel  Kast.38
The  authors  of El Ladrillo proposed  a  new  social  security  policy  which  included  the
development of a system that would be  "fair and  efficient".  The new system would be made
up  of two  sub-systems:  one,  run by the  state,  which  would pay  a  minimum  pension  to  all
workers  covered by the  scheme, and another,  based on a system of savings  "to be deposited
monthly  in  a  specialized  institution,  in  accordance  with  a  contractual  mechanism  for  the
delegated  management  of such funds".  These funds would be "retrievable"  only in the form
of a pension annuity and would be managed by specialized institutions "similar"  to the Savings
and  Loans  Associations,  which  could  also  manage  the  "pre-paid"  health  system,  industrial
accident insurance and unemployment insurance.
El Ladrllo includes  at least two elements that characterized  the reform which was finally
passed in  1980.  First,  the  conviction  that  parametric  or  partial  reforms  to  the  traditional
programmes  were  not a  long  term  solution  for  the  problems  of social  security  and  that  a
completely  new  system  should replace  those  existing at that  time.  Secondly, that to  avoid  a
repetition  of the  problems  of the  old  system,  the  new  system  should  include  elements  of
competition  in  management,  together  with  contractual  saving  mechanisms.  Although  this
model represented  an alternative  radically  different from the prevailing  ideas on social security
at that period  (and for that reason  alone it should be regarded as an exceptional effort),  it did
not  succeed  in  breaking  away  from  that tradition  entirely.  Thus  for  example,  it included  a
proposal that the management  institutions of the new system  be similar  to co-operatives  and
should  be  directed  by  representatives  of the  savers.  Also,  it  suggested  the  formation  of a
"Central Co-ordination  Unit" which could -if necessary- provide support and financial security
to the system.39
The ideas  of El Ladllo served as  a basis  for  the design  of the reform proposals  that
Odeplan  began  to prepare, practically  from  the  start of the  military government which  took
power in  1973.4  The first model that arose  from this work kept the general characteristics of
the solution developed in El  Ladillo, but introduced certain specific changes.  For example, the
idea of a state  sub-system  paying  a rninimum pension  to all  those  over  65  years of age, was
replaced  by  a  scheme  in  which  the State  paid  only  the  difference  between  what would  be
needed to make up a pension at least equivalent to a minimum value,  and the balance actually
38  See De Castro and others (1992)  and Kast (1974).
39  See prologue in De Castro and others (1992, p.11).
40  See Kast  (1974).
17capitalized  by  the worker  at 65  years  of age  (a  design  very  similar to  that which was  finally
passed).  In addition,  an authorization was  included  so that "workers  who had  accumulated
more savings  than the  capital stock required to provide them with a minimum pension" could
use that difference  as a guarantee  to obtain loans in other institutions.
In  some aspects  the Odeplan model represented  a less "liberal"  solution,  which made
more "concessions"  to  social  security  tradition than  that proposed  in El Ladnillo.  Thus,  for
example,  it  proposed  an  investment  scheme  which  obliged  management  companies  to
guarantee with their net worth that savers would receive a real net investment return of at least
6%  per year.  At the  same time it fixed  an upper limit of 2%  to management  charges.  With
regard  to  the  fund-managers,  it  proposed  a  scheme  in  which  "each  Fund  Management
Association  shall belong  to its savers....  who shall  elect a Board,  which  shall be charged  with
hiring the most appropriate individual or company to manage the funds deposited therein"41
At the end of 1974, the governing Military Junta rejected this proposal, but at the same
time  commissioned  Odeplan,  together  with  the  Institute  of  Economics  of  the  Catholic
University of Chile, to go into the studies  already carried out in more depth.  During the next
few years,  Odeplan  presented  various  versions  of its original  project,  but each  of these  was
rejected in tum.42
Finally,  at  the  end  of 1980  the  military  government  lent political  support to  a  new
version of the reform project in which  a team, led by Jose Piiiera E., then Minister of Labour
and  Social Security,  had started working  on in 1979.  Their proposal (which in November  of
that same year,  1980,  was transformed into Law N° 3,500)  consistently reflects  the principles
of the new model of economic policy that was being applied in the country.  Thus the idea of
co-operative or mutual as a vehicle that could be used to manage the funds disappeared and an
alternative  scheme  based  on  private  and  competitive  companies  was  chosen.  Also,  the
guarantee  of absolute  investment  return  to be  covered  by  the  management  companies  was
eliminated,  and the subsidiary role of the State in the pension system was clearly defined.
As  former  minister  Pifiera  said  at  the  time,  "The  military  government  was never  a
monolithic  whole.  The most diverse  trends were  to be  found within  it, and  people of very
different inclinations figured among its supporters, including many who viewed with suspicion
both the possibility of making space  for the private  sector  in this  area  and that of giving  the
workers greater autonomy,  freedom  and control over their  future social  security"4.  The way
the reform model evolved from its first and most general version in El  adrillo  to D.L. 3,500 in
1980,  is a reflection  of this  situation.  Thus,  successive  texts  show, together  with the natural
learning processes of the technical teams responsible,  the way in which the economic ideas of a
free market defended  by a group of public employees and advisors to the military government
were gradually accepted by those who wielded political power at that time.
On  the  other  hand,  whilst  not  abandoning  its  fundamental  principles,  the  reform
project had to adapt itself to the political restrictions  and  economic  realities  of the moment,
41  Kast  (1974, p.56).
42  Infante  (1997).
43  Pinera (1991 a, p.15).
18with the result that in certain cases  compromnise  solutions  were  chosen.  This  was one of the
reasons  why the  Armed Forces  were  excluded  from  the  new system  and  also  explains  why
incorporation  into  the  AFPs  was  made  mandatory  only  for  young  workers  joining  the
workforce after 1983.  At the same time, the over-riding concern of political authorities  for the
security  of the funds, reinforced  by their perception  that existing financial  sector supervisory
institutions had not proved adequate  to control fraud and administrative malpractice  in certain
banking institutions,  led  them  to  impose  a  series  of extraordinarily  demanding  and  detailed
specific  regulations  (still  in  force  today),  which  reduce  the  freedom  of action  of the  fund-
management  companies  and,  eventually,  seem  to  clash  with  the  principle  of  private
management which is so essential to the system.
11I.2  Key aspects of pension reform
There  are  at  least  three  circumstances  which  help  to  explain  why  Chile  decided  to
develop  a totally new pension system  and didn't follow the much easier path of "improving"
the  existing  one.  These  contextual  features  also  serve  to explain  some of the  more  specific
design features of the new system.
First,  at  the  time  of the  reform,  the  old  pension  system  was  already  in  crisis  and
practically  all diagnoses  coincided in pointing out that profound changes were  needed in order
to rescue it from that situation.
Second,  as we have said, the new pension  system was  conceived  as part of a package  of
economic  and social reforms  and was  designed  on the  basis of the same principles  as  those
used  in the  construction  of the  economic  and  social development  model which began to be
implemented  from the very start of the military government.
Third,  in Chile,  social  security programmes  had not been  able  to  "protect themselves"
against  the  constant  pressures  of different interest  groups  trying  to  obtain  special  privileges
from the system  (as  a matter of fact,  this vulnerability of the traditional  systems in the face  of
"political  risk" provided an important explanation  for their lack of funding).  In consequence,
a main  objective of the social  security reform was  that of finding particular design  forms that
would allow social security saving to be protected from this type of political risk.
a) The problems of the old system
The idea that pension programmes needed radical reform had been almost common
place  in  Chile  for  a  considerable  time  before  the  1980  reform.  One  reason  was  the
magnitude  of the  financial imbalances  that were being forecast.  For example,  a study carried
out in 1983  estimated  that, on the basis  of historic growth rates in income and expenditures,
social security  deficit would grow rapidly  until it reached  levels of between  10.3%  and 16.1%
of the  GDP by the year 2000.  By that same  date it was estimated  that the  state contribution
would be  21.5% of GDP.'  Naturally,  this result would have been unsustainable  and for that
reason  changes to cut back benefits  and increase  contribution  rates seemed inevitable,  though
44  Wagner (1983).
19these would  have caused great  political resistance  and would also  have  significantly  impaired
the quality of social protection offered by the system.  In fact, as we saw (see section II.3) even
in  1979,  before  the AFP  system  came into  being,  important  adjustments were  already  being
made to reduce the cashflow imbalance of the system.
The main  causes  of the  financial  deterioration  of the  old  social  security  system  were
mismanagement  of  financial  resources45;  the  use  of  social  security  contributions  to  finance
other types of benefits46;  contribution evasion;  the creation of unfunded  new benefits; and the
provision  of special  benefits  (ike  "matching"4 7 and  early  retirement)  to  some  groups.  For
example, between  1955  and  1979 the relation  of contributors  to pensioners  fell  from  12.2 to
2.5, a result which cannot be  explained by demographic trends, but rather is the consequence
of an extreme generosity in granting benefits.
Another problem of the old scheme was the  fragmentation of its management.  So, in
1980 there were  32 Social Security Funds -"Cajas"- and over 100 different  pension programs,
many of them with such a small number of members that the scale of operation was extremely
inefficient.  Also,  affiliation  to  each institution  was tied  to the  economic  sector in which  the
worker was  employed and the lack of competition  meant that the Cajas  had no incentives  to
do their job efficiently4.
On  the  other  hand,  contribution  rates  were  high  and  differed  from  one  Caja  to
another.  Thus  the  total contribution  rate  for all  the  social  security  programmes  reached  its
maximum  level in  March  1974, with a weighted  average  of 61.9% of the taxable  wage in the
three  main Cajas and a range  between 59%  and 69%.  At that same date, the contribution  rate
for pensions  fluctuated between  16%  and  26% of taxable  wage,  with an  average  of 22.8%49.
This  situation  encouraged  evasion  and  resulted  in  considerable  distortions  in  the  labour
market.
There were also great  differences  in benefit levels and in the requirements  that had  to
be met in order  to obtain them.  In the three  main Cajas  the range of the  maximum  level of
old-age pension at retirement was between 61% and 87% of the taxable wage, with an average
of 68%.  The ages required in order to qualify for old-age retirement varied between  55 and 65
years, but there were also pensions for years of service  (except in the Social Insurance  Service -
SSS  - the  Caja which  contained  65% of active contributors  in  1979,  mainly  manual workers
and certain  independent groups)  which would be  granted, depending  on the Caja,  with  13 to
35 years  of services  or  contributions.  The level of pensions  granted by  the  Cajas  gradually
decreased  over  dime.  There  were  no automatic  mechanisms  to index  pensions  to  inflation
45  Examples  of this  latter  were  the  granting  of loans  and  the building  of housing  for  a minority,
without safeguarding  the real value of the capital that had been invested or lent, and investment in
bonds with a face value below that of inflation. Godoy and Valdes  (1994, pp. 138 and 139).
46  Cheyre  (1991,p.72).
47  Pensions  that were  readjusted  according  to the variations  in  the wages  of active  workers  in  the
same jobs as those that had been held by the pensioners.
48  Cheyre  (1991, pp 40-57).  The  management  institutions  of the old system  are known  as  Cajas de
Previsi6n.
49  Social  Security  Service  (SSS),  Private  Employees'  Social  Security  Fund  (EMPART)  and  the
National Fund of Public Employees and Journalists  (CANAEMPU).
20(except  in  the  case  of privileged  groups),  and  adjustments  depended  on  availability  of state
funds and the needs of the government then in power to obtain electoral support.
Between  1962  and  1980,  average  old-age  pensions  paid  by  the  three  main  Cajas
decreased  in  real terms  by  42.7%  (an  annual rate  of -2.0%).  By  1980,  70% of workers  were
receiving the minimnum pension.  Moreover, workers had no certainty of receiving the benefits
because  in most cases  the Cajas  insisted that at the moment of applying  for them the worker
should  be  paying  contributions,  so  that  an unemployed  worker  could  not obtain  a  pension
even though he had been contributing throughout the whole of his earlier working life.  In the
Social  Insurance  Service,  there  was  a  special  requirement  concerning  the  densitv  of
contributions.;'
The need for social security reform was therefore  an issue on which there was almost a
consensus.  In fact, even back in 1956 a rmission of foreign experts (Klein-Sacks) had suggested
making important changes  to Chile's social security system, but in the end these were not put
into  effect.  New  reform  recommendations  were  proposed  by  an  ad  hoc  conmmission
assembled in  1960  (the Prat Cornmission)  and  others were included in a draft law sent to the
National Congress by President Eduardo Frei Montalva in  1968.  However,  since there was no
common diagnosis  of the  causes of the  crisis  and also because  the problems began  to make
themselves  felt at a period in which there was a high degree of political conflict in the country,
it was not possible to reach agreements with regard to the  characteristics  of the solution that
should  be  given  to  the problem.  Therefore,  since  the  early  60s,  all reform  attempts  were
frustrated  by  the  opposition  of  various  interest  groups,  which  managed  to  paralyze  the
corresponding parliamentary initiatives.  In fact, the 1980 reform itself was strongly questioned
by critics who argued that the system already in existence  did not need to be replaced, and that
parametric  reforms  (adjustments  in  pensionable  ages;  contribution  rates;  conditions  for
qualifying for benefits) would be sufficient to restore its fairness and financial equilibrium.
b) Social  secutity  reform and  economic model
For  those responsible  for  the 1980  reform,  the problems  in  social security  were  yet
another  manifestation  of the  failure  of  a  model of economic  and  social  development  that
needed  to be replaced.  In  their  opinion,  these problems  could  not be attributed  to isolated
episodes  of poor  management  or  specific  design  faults  that  could  be  corrected  by  partial
adjustments of the system.  According to their view, since the principles on which the "pay-as-
you-go"  system  had been  built were wrong,  the reform  had  to be  deep  and  radical  and  the
social security system  should be rebuilt on new, different foundations.  To quote the words of
Jose  Pinera,  "...  the  basic  mistake  [of  the  former  pension  system]  lay  in  the  collectivistic
concept of man and society which inspired the old system.  That inspiration arises from a false
ideological notion of the nature and conduct of the human being,  and has predominated and
influenced many public decisions  adopted in Chile in the last  few decades."'"  As  a result, the
new pension  system was based on the same principles  that guided the economic policy of the
military government  and, in general, its specific design characteristics  follow these principles.
5  The worker should have contributed for at least half of the affiliation period.  Cheyre (1991,  pp 46-
47).
51  Pifiera (1988, p.320).
21c) Political  isk
The history of Chilean social security has been described  as an uninterrupted  sequence
of schemes  specially  created  for  groups  with  political  power  and  of resources  collected  by
pension programmes being used to finance other types of benefits.
This  situation was perhaps  the most dangerous  manifestation  of the "structural"  flaws
of the old pension system.  As there was no freedom of choice, nor a strong relation between
the value of the benefits received and the contributions made by the worker to the system, and
as the decision-making process was centralized,  it was inevitable that the pressures of different
groups of workers would be brought to bear on the political authorities  in order to create new
programmes for their own benefit.52 Thus, "the successive  appearance of groups protected by
various  social  security  schemes  can  be  explained  in  political  terrns  as  the  result  of the
negotiation  and trading of social security benefits in exchange  for political  favours which were
considered  as  social conquests  by each  group".53 Moreover,  in  this  way  the political  agents
themselves  gained power to manipulate  the freedom of such groups, "under typical "clientele
formulae".54
The protection of mandatory social security contributions  from the risk represented by
short-term  political-economic  cycles  thus  became  a  central  objective  of pension  reform  in
Chile.  In our opinion, it is difficult to understand many of the specific design characteristics  of
the new pension system without considering  this particular circumstance.
IV.  RESULTS OF THE AFP SYSTEM
The AFP system has been in operation  now for twenty years.  Although this period is
still  insufficient to evaluate  its long-term  performance5 5,  the  analysis  of its results  could shed
some  light  on  future  trends  and  also  helps  to  identify  aspects  of its  design  that  might  be
improved.
IV.1  Coverage
One measure of coverage  of a pension system is  the ratio between contributors  and
the total employment in the economy56. In  Chile, this indicator  shows that total coverage  of
mandatory pension systems  for the civilian population, which is estimated by adding together
the contributors to the AFPs  and to the old system (INP), rose from 53%  in 1982  to 70% in
1997 (see Table 2).  This result is explained  mainly by the high economic growth between  1985
52  Pifiera (1988, p. 320).
53  Godoy and Valdes  (1994, p.140).
54  Godoy and Valdes  (1994, p.141).
55  For example,  the old-age pensions that are being paid out at present have been financed to a larger
extent with the Recognition Bond and not with contributions paid to personal accounts;  some of
the workers who receive  pensions were already  pensioners under the old scheme and contributed
to the AFP system for a very short time, with the result that their pension  level in the latter system
is low; etc.
56  See Chamorro  (1992)  for a description of different coverage measures.
22and 1997.  However, this figure  is still lower than the maximum levels  of coverage  achieved by
the old system during the decade of the 70s (86o/o)57.
Coverage of the AFP system rose sharply in the period 1982-97,  particularly  in the early
years  after  the reform  (1981-1985),  which is  explained  by the  large-scale  transfer of workers
from the old system  to the AFPs.  After this  first  stage, coverage continued  to increase but at
slower  pace,  reaching  61%  in  December  1997.  However,  during the  past three  years  (1998-
2000) coverage of the AFP system seems to have leveled at 60%  (see Table 2).
Coverage  of the AFP system is limited mainly because the very low proportion of self-
employed workers  that  choose  to participate  in  the  system.  In June  2001,  only  67,125  self-
employed  workers  contributed  in the  AFPs,  out of 1,301,080  persons  self-employed  at  that
time.  This means that coverage  of the AFP system among the self-employed,  was only 5,2%.
As of the  same  date,  self-employed  contributors  accounted  for 2,5%  of all AFP  contributors,
whilst self-employed workers represented 24,7%  of total employed people in the country.  So
far no solution has been  found to the problem of low coverage  of the  self-employed.  In our
opinion,  what  may  seem  as  the  most  simple  solution which  is  to make  mandatory  for  this
workers to become members of an AFP (they are not forced to do this now), will not work in
practice since there is no way to check compliance with this obligation  (in Chile, self-employed
workers  usually  don't pay income  taxes).  Also,  this  reform may  face strong opposition  from
the  self-employed  themselves  since  their  net  income  would  fall  as  they  have  to  pay
contributions to the pension program.
A  different  measure  of  coverage,  the  ratio  of  contributors  to  members,  exhibits
different  tendencies.  This  ratio  decreased  from  73,6%  in  1982  to  50,9%  in  2000.  Many
observers  of the  AFP  system  have  emphasized  this  result,  concluding  that the  low ratio  of
contributors  to members  is an indicator of a high  degree of non-compliance  with the mandate
to pay  contributions  (See  Table  2).  However,  evidence  suggests  that the difference  between
the  two  figures  is  explained,  first,  by  persons  who  have  left  the  work  force  but  are  still
registered  as members  of an AFP  and,  second,  by members  of an AFP who are  not paying
contributions  because  they are unemployed.  So, effective  non-compliance  would not be high
(or higher than in the old system).  In  fact,  estimates  of the AFP industry  show that unpaid
contributions,  both  declared  and  undeclared,  are equivalent  to 0.7%  of the pension  funds58.
This low non-compliance  rate may be explained  by the strong incentives  that the AFP system
offers for the payment of contributions, which includes  a direct relation between contributions
paid by the worker and the benefits  that are received;  penalties  to employers who do not pay
contributions  or who do so late (fines, application of higher-than-market interest rates);  and a
prohibition  for  the  AFP  to  collect  management  charges  from  a  member  unless  the
contributions  are registered in his personal  account.  Moreover,  the AFPs are obliged by law
to execute all necessary actions  (including filing legal demands) against employers  in order  to
recover  outstanding  contributions  (statistics  indicate  that  a  high  percentage  of outstanding
contributions is finally paid as a result of AFP actions and by voluntary decision of employers).
57  Cheyre  (1991, page 44).  This author argues that the information about contributors to the "Cajas"
has inconsistencies  so historical coverage figures would not be trustable.
58  See PrimAmerica  Consultores  (August 2001, Figure N 03).
23IV.2  Pensions
The number of pensioners in the AFP  system increased  from 4,465 in December  1982
to  363.351  in  the  same  month  of 2000.  On the  latter  date  there were  17  members  and  9
contributors  per  pensioner.  Old-age  pensions  represent  62.0%  of total  pensions,  those  for
disability  7.1%,  and  those  for  survivorship,  30.8%.  More  than  half  (58.7%)  of  old-age
pensioners  actually  took  early retirement.  Of all pensioners  at the  end of 2000,  40.6%  had
chosen scheduled withdrawal,  57.6% a life annuity, and 1./8%  temporary income with deferred
life annuity.
The  life  annuity  market has  developed  very  rapidly  both  as  a  result of the  absolute
increase  in the number of pensioners  in the AFP system  and  also because  the proportion  of
pensioners who choose this pension modality is also growing  (see Table 2).  The premiums  of
life  annuities  received  by the  life  insurance  companies  rose tenfold between  1988  and  1999,
which translates into a real annual growth rate of 23.5%.  The share of life annuities premiums
in  total direct premiums  collected  by  life  insurance  companies  rose  from  2 9.8%  in  1988  to
65.2% in 1999.
Sapelli  and  Iglesiass9  present  four  explanations  for  the  increase  in  the  demand  for
pension  system-related  life  annuities:  i)  as  the  AFP  system  matures,  a  higher proportion  of
members  is  authorized  to choose  a life annuity  (only members who would receive  a pension
equal to or greater than  the minimum old-age pension may opt for a life annuity); ii)  there are
more insurance companies  making commercial  efforts  to capture pensioners  (whilst the AFPs
have  no  clear  incentives  for  selling  scheduled  withdrawals);  iii)  a  greater  preference  for life
annuities,  explained  by  the  experience  of pensioners  under  the  scheduled  withdrawal  mode,
who have  seen  the amount of their pensions  fall in years  when the investment results  of the
pension funds have been unsatisfactory,  and which are more aware of the impact of longevity
over their pensions; and iv) the large increase in the number of early (or "anticipated'"  old-age
pensions,  a  factor  which,  in  the  opinion  of the  authors,  and  as  we  will  see  in  the  next
paragraphs,  could be  the main cause  of growth  in life annuities  (at the end of 1999,  84%  of
pensioners taking early retirement had bought life annuities).
The insurance  companies  market life annuities  through brokers, their own sales  agents
and freelance  agents.  The agents are intermediaries  who sell exclusively for one company and
generate  almost  70%  of life  annuity  sales.  Despite  the  fragmentation  of the  intermediation
market and  the virtual  absence  of entry  barriers,  intermediation  fees  for  life  annuities  have
risen year by year, reaching an average of 5,9%  of the value of the premium  (capital transferred
by the member to the insurance company)60 by the year 2000.
The average monthly amount for normal and early old-age pensions was U$  18061  and
U$281  respectively,  as  of December  2000, whilst  the  average  for  disability  and survivorship
(widowhood)  pensions was U$243 and U$99 (see Table 2).
59  See Sapelli and Iglesias (December 2000).
60  See section VI.4 for a discussion of this problem.
61  Ch. $ converted to U$ at an exchange  rate of Ch. $574.63 per US$, which was the average value of
the dollar observed in December 2000.
24Although  there  are  no  available  data  broken  down  by  sex,  the  amount  of old  age
pensions  should  be  higher  for  men  than  for  women,  because  the  latter  have  higher  life
expectancies  and can retire five years earlier62. As was remarked above,  this situation may have
important  effects on the level of expenditure  on minirnum pensions.  In any case, regulations
allow the woman (or man) to delay the age of retirement in order to increase the amount of the
benefit.
When the AFP system was set up, it was estimated  that with a contribution rate of 10%
of taxable wage  and with rates of return of the personal accounts of 4% per year in real terms,
workers  could purchase  old-age pensions  equivalent  to  75%  of their  final wages63. A  study
carried  out  by  a  pension  fund-management  company  in  1994,  which  included  6,000
pensioners,  found that the first payments of early old-age pensions were equivalent to  81%/'o  of
the wage,  and  to  73%  in the  case of normal  old-age  pensions.  If the  value of "legal"  lump
sums  paid is added  to the pension,  early pensions rise to 86%  of the wage and normal old-age
pensions  to 81%.  In the case of disability pensions,  the ratio was  found to be 70%, which is
the percentage  established in the regulations64.
The  current  level  of  old-age  pensions  is  strongly  influenced  by  the  amount  of  the
Recognition Bonds, which represent a high percentage of the balances in the personal accounts
of workers who have retired, and by the situation  of pensioners  who receive  a pension from
the  old  scheme  but  did  continue  to  work,  paid  contributions  for  some  years  to  the  AFP
system,  and now are  receiving a second pension from the AFP system.  The first generations
of workers to retire in the future, financing their benefits entirely with capitalzed contributions
in the AFPs, without Recognition  Bonds, will benefit from  the high average investment rates
of return obtained in the period 1981-2000.  For example, if one forecasts the old-age pension
to be received by a worker who began work in May 1981, assuming a yield of 5% per annum in
real terms from 2001  onwards, he should get a pension equivalent to 102% of his final wages.
Pensions paid by the AFP system are comparatively higher than those of the old scheme.
The  latest  information  published  by  the  Superintendency  of AFPs  (corresponding  to June
1992), indicated that pensions  for old-age  and disability under the AFP system were 43% and
6 8%  higher  than  the  average  amount  for  the  same  type  of pensions  in  the  old  "Cajas  de
Previsi6n".  Widowhood  pensions  under  the  AFP  were  42%  higher  than  under  the  old
scheme, while those for orphans were 9% lower65.
62  The impact of the differences  in life  expectancy on pension  levels  is reduced in the case of men
who  have a wife with the right to a survivorship  pension,  since the latter's  life expectancy  is also
taken into account when  calculating old-age pensions.
63  See Larrain  (1991).
64  See Baeza  (1996).
65  When  making these  comparisons,  no correction  was made  for  the probable underestimation  of
the value of the pensions paid by the AFR  system, due to withdrawals of disposable  surpluses and
double pensions.
25IV.3  Pension fund growth
The  aggregate  value  of Pension  Funds  managed  by  the  AFPs  grew  at  a  real  annual
average rate of 29%  in the period 1981 to 2000, rising from U$ 300 million (0.9% of the GDP)
in December 1981 to U$ 37,752 milion (54.6%  of the GDP) in December 2000.  This  growth
is  explained  by  the  mass  transfer  of workers  from  the  old  system  to  the  AFPs;  the  high
average  investment  rate  of return  (see  point  TV.4  next);  the  high  ratio  of contributors  to
pensioners  in  the  system;  and  the  country  economic  growth  in  the  period  (because  of its
impact on real wages and on employment).
Chile's  Superintendency  of AFPs  forecasts  that  the value  of the Pension  Funds  will
grow at a real annual average  rate of 7.1% between 2002 and 2023.  This means that the value
of the  funds  will  grow  from  U$42,266  million  (58.2%  of the  GDP)  to  U$177,642  million
(87.8% of the GDP) in the period.
IV.4  Investment returns
Real  average  annual investment return  of pension  funds was  11 %  between  May  1981
and  December  2000'.  Annual  returns  have  shown  considerable  fluctuations,  achieving  a
maximum  of 29.7%  in 1991  and a minimum of -2.5% in  1995.  This fluctuation  is explained
by the fact that pension fund investments  are valued daily at market prices, so that the changes
in  share prices  and  the movements  in interest  rates  are transmitted  swiftly  to pension  funds
assets accounting prices and estimates of return (see Table 2).
Since  there is no appropriate benchmark with which to compare  investment returns, it
is not possible to draw  firm conclusions regarding the quality  of the investment management
of the AFPs.  However, and as a reference, in Table  2 we have included the annual variation in
the  Selective  Share  Price  Index  (IPSA)  of the Santiago  Stock Exchange  and the  real interest
rates on deposits between  90 and  365  days.  Between  1981  and  2000, average  pension  funds
investment returns was  3.8 percentage points higher than the average interest  rate of deposits,
and  11.9  percentage  points lower than  the average  yield  of the IPSA.  In any  case,  there  are
three  factors  which  are  not under  the  control  of AFPs  management  and  have  influenced
historic  investment returns:  investmnent  regulations,  which  prevent  portfolio  managers  from
tracking  the market portfolio67; the State support to collapsing  financial institutions  following
the  economic  crisis  of the years  1982  and  1983,  which  made  it possible  for holders  of the
banks' debt instruments, among them the pension funds (at that period over 50% of the funds
were  invested in bank debt securities),  to avoid heavy losses; and  strong  economic growth of
the economy between  1984  and 1998, which resulted in  a significant increase  in the value of
the country's assets.
66  Figures presented in this section and the following one refer to Type 1 Pension Funds which have
been
in existence since the system began.  Type 2 Pension Fund only came into existence in May 2000.
67  See  Srinivas  and  Yerrno  (1999)  and  Valdes  (2000)  for an  analysis  of the  potential  impact  of
investments
regulations on pension fund returns.
26Undoubtedly,  historic returns are higher than those that can reasonably  be forecast for
the future, but  even so,  these last  figures  should  be higher than the figures  used to  forecast
pensions when the system began  (4%  to 5%).  In an economy where there is no excess  capital,
the  expected  return  on  capital  should  be  higher  than  the  rate  of growth  in  wages  and
employment.  In  fact,  information  based  on  many  countries  and  periods  shows  that  this
difference  may  be between  2  and  3  percentage  points68. In our opinion,  this  means  that in
Chile's  case,  a  5%  (real)  rate of return is a lower limit for forecasting  the long term  return of
the pension funds.
IV.5  Returns  of  personal accounts
The net return of personal accounts,  which  is relevant to estimate  the balances which
members of the AFP system will have accumulated at the end of their working life and the old-
age pensions that they will be able to pay for, depends both on the return of the pension funds
and  on those management  fees that are  charged  to the  balances  accumulated  in the personal
accounts.  At present,  only  a  fixed  charge  is  deducted  from  such  balances  (the  percentage
charge is deducted from taxable wage).  Because of the existence of this fixed charge, low wage
earners  obtain  lower  returns  in  personal  accounts  than  high  wage  earners  workers,  but  the
difference  has  decreased  over time  due  to  the increase  in personal account  balances  and  the
reduction  of the  fixed  charge.  The net return  of the individual  accounts,  defined in the way
described earlier for a contributor with an average wage of UF 20, was 9,2%  per annum in real
terms  in  the period  1981-199869  (the  average  taxable  wage of contributors  to the  system  is
currently  close to  UF 20).  In the  same  period, the  net return  for contributors  with average
wages  of UF  10 and  UF  60 was  8,1%  and  9,9%,  respectively70. The  average  return  of the
pension funds was  11%  in the period  1981-1998.
IV.6  Operational  costs  and management charges
In June 2001, AFPs  average management  charges were equal to 2.3%  of taxable wage
(including the cost of the disability and survivorship  insurance, which at that date represented
approximately  0.8% of taxable wage), plus  a fixed monthly charge of U$ 0.81.  Between  1981
and  1984,  AFPs  increased  the  percentage  charge  in  an  effort  to compensate  the impact on
their income of the reduction in real wages and employmnent  caused by the crisis in 1982-1983
and  the  higher  cost  of the  disability and  survivorship  insurance.  However,  since  1985  this
charge  has  fallen  almost  constantly  (see  Table  2).  Between  1981  and  1997,  fixed  charges
showed  a  similar  trend.  However,  in  1998 this trend  was reversed,  and the  charge began  to
increase.  At  the  beginning  of  the  system,  the  AFPs  were  also  authorized  to  charge  a
percentage  on the balance in the personal account, but this was eliminated in 1988.
The  AFPs  total  income  from management  charges net  of the  cost  of the  insurance
premium for disability and survivorship  (which is a better indicator of the price charged by the
AFPs), rose from U$  64 per year per contributor in  1982  to U$  84 in  1983  and it fluctuated
between  U$  74  and  U$  81  in  the  period  1984-1987.  Despite  the  fall  in  the value  of the
68  See World Bank (1994).
69  PrimnAm&ica  Consultores  (1999).
70  UF 10 = U$242, UF 20 = U$485 and UF 60 = 1.455, as of August 2001.
27percentage  charge  since  1985,  AFPs  income  rose  steadily  from  1988  until  1997,  increasing
from U$75 to US$176 per year, per contributor.  In the period 1998-2000, it fell to a level close
to  U$131  (see  Table  2).  The  rise  in  the  period  1988-97  is  explained  by  the  increase  in
contributors'  taxable wage,  which was greater than the decline  recorded in  the percentage  fee
charged on taxable wage.  However,  between  1998-2000 the decline  in this  fee (which may be
explained  by the reduction  in AFPs commercial  expenses, in turn due to the reduction in the
number of transfers), was greater than the increase in wages.
During  the  past  few  years,  there  has  been  an  intense  debate  regarding  the  level  of
insurance and management  charges in Chile's AFP system.  Many observers  (including present
authorities)  think that they are high, particularly when compared with management  charges  in
other  financial  industries  of the  country  and  with  management  charges  in  other  countries
privately-managed pension systems.
A study by Rodriguez71 shows that,  excluding the  disability and survivorship  insurance,
between May  1981  to June  1998 the cost of AFP charges was equivalent to 1.3%  of the assets
managed.  The  same  study  forecasts  that if  the  rates  of management  charges  were  to  be
maintained  at their 1998 levels, the equivalent cost would be 0.53% of the assets for the period
May  1981-May  2021.  According  to  Rodriguez,  these  figures  are  lower  than  the  average
management charges  of fixed  and variable income mutual  funds in Chile  (2.9%  of the assets);
than  the  average  management  charges  of mutual  funds  in  the United  States  (1.1%  of the
assets);  and than  the average  management  charges  of the 401K pension plans  of the  United
States (1.25%  of the managed fund).
Valdes7  compares AFP charges  in the period 1997-1998 with fees charged by financial
institutions  on  bank  savings  books  and  on  time  deposits,  and  with  the  costs  of  the
stockbrokers  on  custody  accounts  (induding  the  profit  margin).  He  shows  that  the  AFP
charges  during  this  period  were  67%  higher  than  the  lowest-cost  alternative  of the  three
mentioned  above.  In  a  different  study,  Vald6s73 compares  prices  charged by  pension  fund
management  firms  in  ten  countries,  correcting  them  for  differences  in  disability  and
survivorship insurance rates and by purchasing power.  He concludes that Chile is in the group
of "expensive"  countries  (the  third  most  expensive  of the  seven  countries  in  that  group).
According to this study, the "cheap"  countries are Bolivia, Mexico and Australia.  (Low charges
in Bolivia would be explained by the lower levels in the quality of service offered by the fund-
management  companies,  whilst  in  Mexico  the lower  charges  may  be explained  as  a part of
commercial strategies implemented by some AFORES that are trying to gain market share).
Valdes  and  Bateman74 compare  in detail  Australia  and  Chile's  systems  and  conclude
that in  1997 the  price in Australia  was  60%  lower than in  Chile.  However, when  charges are
projected  over  the whole  active  life  of the worker,  the price in Australia  comes  to 30% less
than  that charged  by the Chilean AFPs.  According to this  study,  the cost advantages  of the
Australian system may be explained mainly by the  fact that employers  are authorized to create
71  See Rodriguez  (1998).
72  Article published in ElDiario  on 31st May  1999.
73  Valdes  (1999).
74  Vald6s and Bateman (1999).
28"closed AFPs";  by the existence of regulations  that impose  fewer conditions on the formation
of fund-management  companies  and that allow  greater  flexibility  in defining  the  number  of
investment  portfolios  that may  be offered  to members  and  the  type of charges  that may be
established;  and  by  a more  highly-developed  taxation  system  and  greater  penetration  of the
financial  industry,  which  give  fund-management  companies  the  support  of  a  better
"institutional infrastructure"  and, through this, access to economies of scale and scope.
James,  Smalhout and Vittas75 concluded  that Chile has  the smallest expense  ratio per
unit of assets in Latin America,  due to its large  average account size, and that Mexico  has the
highest  cost per  unit of assets,  because  of its small  average  account  size  and  start-up  costs.
However,  the  cost per member  in Mexico  is  lower than  in Chile because  its account  size is
much smaller than Chile's, a result that should change over time.
Although  the controversy  has not yet ended  due, in part, to the difficulties  to compare
industries  which  offer  non-homogenous  services  and  also  the  fact  that  pension  systems  of
different countries are at different stages of development,  in our opinion one conclusion of the
debate  is that the price charged  by Chile's AFP  could be reduced  provided some  regulations
are changed.  We will return to this  subject in Section VI.2.
IV.7  AFP industry organization
Since the early days of the AFP system, there has  been intense competition within the
industry.  In December  1981  there were  12  fund-management  companies in  operation,  which
were owned  by entrepreneurial  groups, workers'  associations  and trade unions. As a result of
the  financial  crisis  that  occurred  in  1982,  the  government  intervened  in  various  financial
institutions  and  the  share  in  the  AFPs  held  by  their  respective  controlling  groups  was
liquidated  in a process  know as "popular  capitalism" and through  the sale of shares to foreign
financial institutions and insurance companies7 6.
The number  of fund-management  companies remained  relatively  constant until  1990,
the  year  in  which  the  military  government  came  to  an  end  and  a  democratically  elected
president  took  office.  Once  the  doubts  about  the  new government's  support  of the  AFP
system had been dispelled, and its  desire  to encourage  the  entry  of other companies into the
market became known, a considerable increase in the number of competitors  took place, with
the number of AFPs reaching 21  in December  1994.  The high average  return  to net assests
recorded  by  the AFPs  during  those  years  also  contributed  to  this  expansion  (see  Table  2).
Later,  a period of consolidation  began in the industry, characterized  by mergers  and take-over
processes  that  brought  down  the  number  of AFPs  until, by  August  2001,  seven remained.
This  is  explained  by  the  intensity of the  competition,  which  prevented  various AFPs  from
achieving market  shares that would allow them  to reach break-even point and make the most
of the economies of scale that ostensibly exist in the AFP industry.
75  James, Smalhout and Vittas  (2001).
76  '"opular capitalism"  was  a programme  to sell  shares  to the public, granting  long-term loans  and
tax advantages to pay for them.
29Currently  the largest fund-management  companies  are controlled by groups which also
have  investments  in  the  banking  and  insurance  sectors,  with  a  notable  growth  in  the
participation of foreign investors.  Workers and trade unions no longer own an AFP  77.
The levels of market concentration,  measured by the volume of managed funds, tended
to  decline  between  1981  and  1994.  In  this  period,  various  small  and  medium-sized  AFPs
increased  their market  share  and  new  fund-management  companies  were  formed.  Between
1995  and 2001 the trend has been reversed as a result of the process of mergers  and takeovers.
The Herfindahl index fell from 0.217 in 1981  to 0.125 in 1994 and rose to 0.207 in December
2000.  As regards the number of contributors, the situation is different, because  the index had
a value of 0.184 in 1982 and 0.255 in December 2000, also showing a significant increase in the
last four years  (in 1994 it was 0.178; see Table  2).
The increased  industry  concentration  and the participation  of groups with interests  in
the banking and insurance  sectors in the  ownership of the  fund-management  companies,  has
given rise to a debate regarding the "economic power"  of the AFPs in terms of their ability to
influence  the management  of companies  in which  pension  funds  are  invested.  However,  in
our opinion, this concem does not seem to be based on objective facts,  since the AFPs are not
allowed  to  elect  the  majority  of the  board  of directors  in  any of the  companies  - over  a
hundred  of them  - in  which  they  have  investments  (in  fact,  the  directors  who  have  been
elected with  AFP votes represent less than 10%  of the total number of board members in the
companies  where  pension  funds  are  invested),  and  also  because,  as  the  intemational
diversification of the portfolios  increases, the relative participation of the AFPs in local issuers
will tend to decline78.
It  has  also  been  an issue  of controversy  that,  as  a  result  of the concentration  of the
industry,  there  will  be  more  opportunities  for AFPs  to influence  the prices  of the  financial
assets  in which  pension  funds  are invested.  However,  the  evidence  suggests  that the  AFPs
power  to  exert influence  over  asset  prices  is not  substantially  different  than  other  financial
intermediaries  of  similar  size,  including  life  insurance  companies.  Also,  the  growing
integration  of Chile's  capital  market  with international  capital  markets  prevent  any  market
participant to have a significant influence on asset prices.
V.  ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF PENSION REFORM IN CHILE
The  creation  of a  pension  system  that accumulates  financial  reserves  has  five  main
potential  effects  on the  economy:  it may  affect  the  fiscal  situation;  total  savings  and  their
composition; capital market development; labour market; and overall economic  efficiency.
In Chile's  case,  it is  difficult  to estimate  the magnitude  of each one of these  effects,
since  the  creation  of the  AFP  system  coincided  with  another  set  of economic  reforms;
important  external  shocks  (particularly  at  the  beginning  of the  1980s),  and  considerable
adjustments  to  the  old  social  security  system,  phenomena  which  also  produced  their  own
impact on savings, the capital market and the labour market.  This explains why, even though
77  The last  AFP own by a workers union, Aporta Fomenta, was  sold at the beginning of 2001.
78  See Iglesias (1998).
30twenty  years  have passed  since  the  reform,  discussion  on  these  subjects  still  has  a  marked
conceptual bias, and also explains why there is little consensus on empirical results to date.
In the following pages  we will go through this debate and comment on the main results
that have been  found for the Chilean case, concentrating  on the effects  of the reform  on the
fiscal deficit, savings, and the capital market.
V.1  Fiscal impact
The  creation  of the AFP  system  had  fiscal  consequences  because  the  old  pension
system was  running  at a loss  and the  State was  financing  its  deficit.  In  this  context,  all  the
effects of the reform on the value of the old social  security  system debt and on the profile  of
future contributions and pension payments, had a direct impact on the public budget.
The  main  effects  of the  reform  on  the  deficit  of the  old  pension  system  were  as
follows:  First,  with  the  large-scale  transfer of workers  from  the old pension  system into  the
new AFP  system  (see  Table  2)  the  old  system was  deprived  of its  main  form  of funding  -
contributions  - increasing  its  short-term  operational  deficit  (but  also  reducing  its  future
expenditure on pensions).  In the second place, the obligation to pay Recognition Bonds to the
workers  who  transferred  and who  would  retire under  the new  system  changed  the  duration
profile of the pension  system  deficit and, as we have  seen,  also  changed  the present value  of
that  debt'9. Finally,  the  1980  reform  had  fiscal  impact  through  the  expected  outlay  on
minimum and welfare pensions.
One  way  of  estimating  the  impact  of all  these  changes  would  be  to  measure  the
difference,  year  to year, between  the social  security deficit without  the reform  and the actual
social  security deficit  after the reform.  Unfortunately  there  are no estimations  of the deficit
"without the reform"  that could make it possible to carry out this exercise80. We will therefore
limit ourselves  to  giving  a documentary  account  of the historic evolution  and  projections  of
pension system deficit,  figures which give us a measure of the effort that the government  has
made and  will have to make  in the coming years  to pay off the obligations of the old system
and finance the costs of minimum and welfare pensions programs.
a) The evolution of  the pension system  deficit: 1981-1998
The "total pension system deficit" is equal to the sum of the operational  deficits of the
pension  programmes  for  the  civilian  sector  under  the  old  system  (the  difference  between
income  collected  from contributions  and expenditure  in  benefits paid out, without including
the spending on minimum and welfare pensions),  plus payments of recognition bonds  and the
cost of minimum and welfare pensions".
9  See Section II.1.c
80  Wagner  (1983,  Vol.I,  pp  205-208)  presents  some  highly  aggregated  estimations  up  to the  year
2000, but they are of no use for this purpose.
81  The  deficit of the  programmes  for the  Armed  Forces  is excluded  from  this  definition,  as  also
government expenditure  on other social security programmes.
31Both  the  operational  deficit and the  expenditure in Recognition  Bonds  are  transitory
and will  disappear in  the future  as the number of pensioners  under the old  system decreases
and those who transferred to the AFP system retire.  We will therefore  term  the sum of these
items  the  "transitory pension deficit"  reflecting  the value of the obligations  of the old system
to its pensioners  and affiliates, which therefore represent  a measure of the value of the implicit
debt contained within that system.
In  the years  immediately  following the  reform,  over 75%  of the members of the old
system  transferred  to the  new AFP  system.  This  meant  a considerable  reduction  in  income
from contributions,  which was not accompanied  by an immediate  decrease  in expenditure  on
pensions,  since  payment  of benefits  to workers  who were  no  longer active  had  to continue
(however future expenditure in pensions did decrease).  The impact of the loss of income from
contributions  on the operational  deficit  may be illustrated by estimating the total sum of the
contributions  paid by members of the new social security system (which corresponded  almost
exclusively  to workers  who  had transferred  from the  old  system,  especially  during  the  early
years): in 1982, contributions  to the pension funds represented 23,5% of the operational deficit
of the old system and 23,3% of the transitory deficit82 (see Table  5).  The level and trend of the
operational deficit were also influenced by the changes that occurred before the creation of the
AFPs and which made it possible to reduce  the expenditure of the old pension programmes8 3.
In addition,  in  the  years  immediately  following  the  reform,  the  dec]ine  in  the  old  pension
system income was accentuated by the economic crisis which contributed  to a fall in real wages
and an  increase in unemployment.  All these  changes were reflected  in an immediate increase
in the operational deficit of the old pension  system after the reform, which rose from 3.9%  of
GDP in 1981  to 8.0%  in 1982 (see Table  5).
The  expenditure  on  Recognition  Bonds,  the  other  component  of the  "transitory
deficit", has grown steadily, mainly as  a result of the increase in the number of pensioners.  By
1998  it represented  25% of the transitory  deficit and  0.9%  of the GDP.  Thus the  transitory
pension system deficit reached a maximum of 8.1%  of the GDP in the year  1982, imnmediately
following the reform, and then began to fall steadily.  By, 1998 it represented  3.6% of the GDP
(see Table 5).
The minimum and welfare pension programmes were not "created" by the reform and
public  expenditure  in these benefits  is then "permanent".  Although  the  total magnitude  of
expenditure  on minimum pensions is very low compared with other social expenditure  items,
it has tended to rise a fact explained  both by the growth in the real value of this benefit over
time  (see Table  4) and  by the  increase  in the  number of beneficiaries  during the period.  In
addition,  a special  minimum pension was introduced in 1985 for workers over 70 years of age,
which also had the effect of increasing the costs  of the minimum pension program compared
with the situation prior to the reform.
82  However,  this  figure underestimates  the whole effect,  since contribution  rates in the AFP system
are lower than in the old system.
83  See  Section  II.3.  Other  changes  allowed  expenditures  on  different  social  programmes  to  be
reduced.  For example,  members of the new system have no right to the seasonal bonuses received
by the members of the old pension system.
32However, other  changes made in the year  1980 may have compensated  for the effects
mentioned  above.  Specifically,  a requirement was  introduced  whereby workers  who changed
to the AFP system would need 20 years'  contributions in order to qualify for this  (benefit and
not  10  years,  like  the workers  who contribute  under the  old  system).  Another  requirement
imposed on this group  was  that, to qualify  for the minimum pension, their  total income,  and
not just the sum of their pensions,  should be less that the minimum pension'.  On  the other
hand, expenditure  on welfare  pensions rose durng the years of economic crisis (mainly due to
the increased  number of beneficiaries)  and then fell to levels  similar to those observed  at the
beginning of the  decade.  The sum of minimum and welfare  pensions  reached  a maximum of
0.53%  of the GDP in 1986 and then leveled at around 0.3% of the GDP (see Table 5).
As a result of all these effects, the total social security deficit rose from 4.1% in 1981 to
a maximum of 8.4%  of GDP in 1982.  Since that date it has decreased steadily, reaching  3.9%
of the GDP in 1998  (see Table 5)85
b) Forecasts  for the pension system deficit
Forecasts for pension deficit (excluding military) show that, as a result of the decline  in
the operational  deficit,  the  "transitory"  part  (operational  deficit plus  Recognition  Bonds) will
decrease  steadily  right through to the  end of the  forecast period.  The present  value for  the
next ten years for Recognition Bonds and the operational deficit  (at 7%) has been estimated at
US$25,047  million.86 This means that the "permanent"  elements of the pension  system deficit
- minimum and welfare  pensions  - will gradually  increase their  share in the total deficit,  this
being reinforced  by the  evolution of expenditure  on minimum  pensions.  However, the total
magnitude  of the  expenditure  on  these  programmes  is  significantly  lower  than  that  of the
transitory deficit (see Table 6).
There are important  differences  between the various  estimates  of future  spending  on
minimum pensions which are explained in part by the differences in the value assumed for this
pension.  This value is fixed by the Government according  to the availability  of resources  and
its political and social objectives.  The variation in the assumptions reflect, among other things,
differences  in  assumed  investment  returns  an  expected  increase  in  femnale  labor  force
participation,  an  effect which has not been included  in all the research  carried  out87. Arenas
84  There  are  no  figures  to make  it  possible  to  compare  the  expected  expenditure  on  miinimum
pensions prior to the reform with the situation after the changes made in 1980.
85  All  the  above  figures  are  obtained  from Arenas  and  Marcel  (1999).  For the  1981  period  the
results of this  study  show that  the  deficit was  substantiallv higher  than was  estimated  in  earlier
research  (Ortuzar  1988;  SAFP,  1997).  However,  as  these  are  the most recent estimates  and  the
only ones  based  direcdy  on  figures  from  the  Budget  Department,  they  seem  to be  the  most
reliable.  We are grateful  to  the authors  for allowing us to use  this informnation which  is  still at a
preliminary stage of preparation.
96  See  Arenas  and Marcel  (1999).  Corbo  (1979)  had  estimated  the value  of the reserves  that  the
Chilean  pension  system  ought  to  keep  at  U$14,463  million,  as  of July  1977  (this  figure
corresponding  to the  present value  of the future  benefits  that  the system  ought  to pay.  If the
value of the reserves is subtracted, it gives a measure of the economic deficit at that date).
87  Women  retire  earlier  (60 years versus  65  for men),  they  have greater  life-expectancy  and receive
lower wages.  Therefore,  if the  female participation  in the labour market increases,  there  should
33and  Marcel  (1999)  estimate  the present value  of this benefit  (at  7%)  at U$1,346  million  (see
Table 6).  Ortuzar  (1988)  estimates  it at U$534 million.  Wagner  (1990), in his  basic scenario,
estimates  a present value  of U$183 million.  Zurita  (1994),  who attempts  to  capture  the  risk
associated with future variations  in the return on the funds,  estimates  the present value of the
expenditure  on minimum pensions at between U$ 950 and U$1,175 million.
In any case,  all the forecasts  show that the pension system deficit should have  peaked
already  and  that fiscal  expenditures  on pensions  will decline  during the  coming years.  This
change in trend will have important  effects  on the budget and eventually on the composition
of the investment portfolio of the pension funds.
c) Financing  the deficit
Despite its magnitude, it is a striking  fact that the fiscal impact does not seem  to have
been an  important  obstacle  to  the pension  reform  effort  in  Chile.  In  fact,  former  minister
Pinera  cornments  on  the  ease  with  which  the Minister  of Finance  and  the  Director  of the
Budget of that period accepted the pension reform project, and adds that "in terms of present
value, the social security reform was a modernization that,  even from the  fiscal point of view,
was favourable  when compared  with the alternative  of leaving  things as  they were"88. In our
opinion, the economic authorities at that time did share this view and shared Piiiera's view that
pension  system reform was part of a set of economic reforms  that were not independent  of
one another.  This, combined with the fact that the government of the time had both sufficient
will and political power to carry out the adjustments to the fiscal budget that were necessary im
order to confront the social security deficit, were important in advancing the reform.
In  order  to  finance  the  pension  system  deficit,  the government  had  recourse  to  a
combination of instruments, which were used with varying intensities  over time, depending on
the general  economic  conditions  of the  country,  the particular situation  of public  finances  at
different  moments, and the political and economic objectives  of the authorities.  In any case,
an  explicit  objective  of the reform  was  to increase  saving,  and this  determined  in  part  the
strategy for financing the social security  deficit89. Thus, in the years immediately following the
reform,  the  shortfall  was  financed  mainly  with  public  saving  (by  tightening  up  on  other
expenditure  and by imposing a temporary  tax - 3%  of salary to be paid by the employer - , its
declared  objective  being  to  compensate  for  the  elimination  of  contributions  for  family
allowances  and  unemployment  subsidy  programmes,  which  started  to  be  funded  with
resources from the budget)', a situation that is reflected in a fiscal  surplus, net of expenditures
on social security programmes  (see Table  5).  Also, government debt was sold to the pension
also be an increase in expenditure  on minimum  pensions.  The figures  of Wagner and Zurita are
estimated with discount rates of 4% and 5%  respectively.
88  Pifiera (1991', p.33 and p.134).
89  "From  the  economic  point of view,  what  the  Chilean  government  did  was  to  create  a  private
saving, and more than neutralize  the increased  fiscal deficit by restricting government expenditure.
This was done, because the airn was to increase private national savings".  Buchi (1993).
90  This tax decreased by one percentage point per year and disappeared in 1984.
34funds,  whose  investment  in  Treasury  Bonds  rose  from  U$  2.2  million  in  1981  to U$  864
million in 19869'.
From  the  middle  of  the  1980s,  the  constant  efforts  to  suppress  government
expenditure,  received  some  help  in  the  form  of increased  income  from  copper  surpluses;
greater  tax income  as  an effect of the economic  recovery;  and income  from the privatization
programme.  As a result, the non-social security surplus practically doubled between  1982 and
1992,  allowing  the  government  to withdraw  debt  from  the market  (with  the pension  funds
reducing the share of their investment in government bonds).  In 1985, investment of pension
funds in  stocks  was authorized  and the AFPs  began to buy  securities  from public firms  that
were in process of privatization.
The  strategy  for  financing  the pension  system  deficits  may be  divided  then  into two
periods.  In  the  first period,  there  was  a  considerable  effort  to  reduce  non-social-security
expenditure,  and public debt was issued.  During the second  stage, the effect of the economic
recovery  on  government  incomes  played  an  important  role.  In  this  second  period,  the
government  also  substituted  debt  financing  with  sale  of  assets  through  privatization.
Conceptually,  these periods produced different macroeconomic  effects.  With tax financing (or
expenditure  reduction),  private  consumption  tends  to  fall  while  savings  rise  and  the interest
rate tends to fall while the capital/product ratio rises.  By contrast, with debt financing  (or the
sale  of assets),  the  same  adjustment in  consumption would  not occur,  and the  interest rate
tends  to rise  (whilst  the  capital/product  ratio  tends  to  fall).  Given  the  strategy  used in the
Chilean  case,  and particularly,  given  that debt  financing  was  secondary it  is  more  likely  that
92 pension reform  led to an increase in saving and in the capital/product  ratio of the economy
This  financing  strategy  would  also  tend  to  favor  younger  generations  relative  to  older
generations compared with what would have happened if transition deficits had been primarily
debt financed.
V.2  Pension reform and saving
a) Expected effects
The  assessment  of the impact  of pension  reform  on  saving has  been  the  subject  of
some confusion which  empirical  studies  have not helped to resolve.  In the case of Chile, the
discussion has been made particularly  difficult because, as we have already mentioned, pension
reform coincided  with a series  of changes in  other parts of the economy, each of which  may
also have produced an impact on saving.  It should not surprise us therefore that the debate on
this subject is by no means over and that the empirical results are the subject of controversy.
The analysis may be better illustrated by using the following relationship:
91  See Marcel  and Arenas  (1991,  p.379. Pifiera (1991', p.134)  points out that "the negative  effect on
the  fiscal  coffers...was  deliberately  attenuated  by  allowing the AFPs  to invest  these resources  in
governent debt securities".
92  See following section.
35Total Saving = Voluntay Saving by Individuals + Pension System Saving + Corporate Saving +
Government Sating + External  Saving.
Pension  reform has  effects,  both  direct and indirect and of different  sign on each  of
these components  of total saving.  The direct effects  occur in pension system  savings and on
government  saving  (in  this  latter  case,  depending  on  the  financing  strategy  used  by  the
Treasury).  In addition, there may be indirect effects on companies'  savings, due to the changes
m the cost of labour  (because  of the adjustments in contribution rates)  and the impact of the
reform  on the  capital market  and on investment  opportunities  (Hachette,1998).  Individuals'
personal  savings  may also  change  because  of the changes  in the  expected  value  of pension
benefits;  the volume and  direction  of intra-generational  transfers;  less  "short-sightedness"  on
the part of workers;  changes  in the take-home wage; and the possible effects of the reform on
the  distribution  of income  and  the  development  of the  life  annuity  market.  Finally,  the
pension reform may also affect the degree  to which the country is integrated into international
capital  markets,  and  through  this  mechanism,  produce  effects  on external  saving  (Fontaine,
1997).
The  magnitude  of each  of these  effects  depends  on  a  large  number  of factors  (the
sensitivity  of saving  to interest rates;  the  absolute  level of saving  existing before  the reform
took place;  etc.),  an important  aspect being  the degree  of substitution  between  the different
kinds  of saving.  Thus,  the  greater  the  substitution  between  private  saving and government
saving,  between  voluntary  saving  and  social  security  saving,  between  national  saving  and
external  saving,  and  between  personal  saving and  corporate  saving,  the  smaller  will  be the
expected  effect of pension reform on total saving.  A recent  study on private saving  in Chile
(1-lachette,  1998)  concludes  in  its  preliminary  results  that  mandatory  private  saving  (social
security)  and  voluntary  saving  are  close  substitutes,  and  that  public  saving  and  voluntary
private  saving have  also been  shown  themselves  to be good  substitutes.  If these  resuts  are
valid, then no significant impact on national saving should be expected from the reform.
b) The empirical  evidence
Aggregate  savings  figures in Chile  have grown  strongly  since  1985,  once  the  country
recovered  from the  financial  crisis  in  the  first  half of the  80s.  The  historical  coincidence
between  this  phenomenon  and  the  development  of the  AFP  system  suggests  that  pension
reform  may have had a positive  effect on  saving.  However,  for the reasons stated above,  the
evidence must be closely examined before jumping to any more definitive  conclusions.
One  option  is  to  analyze  the  evolution  of  savings  based  on  National  Accounts.
However,  in Chile,  this  approach  confronts  sometimes  insuperable  difficulties.  In  the first
place,  Chilean  National Accounts  measure  private  saving  as  a  "residual"  and  available  data
make it almost impossible  to accurately  measure voluntary  savings  of individuals  (in  fact,  this
figure  is  generally  assumed  to  be  zero,  and  corporate  saving  is  estimated  as  the  difference
between  social security saving and total private saving).  In addition, in the year  1993 National
Accounts were modified and a "methodological"  increase in rates of saving was registered.  On
the  other hand,  this  approach  is  not useful  in  distinguishing  which  changes  in  the  savings
figures  are  due to pension reform and which are due to other modifications.  Research along
these lines has yielded contradictory results.
36Arrau  (1996),  after breaking down  the national  saving  rate into  three  sectors:  (public
corporate  and  personal),  observes  that  individual  saving  (which  would  be  equal  to  the
mandatory social security  saving,  since zero voluntary  saving is assumed)  grows from 0.9%  of
the GDP in  1981  to 3.9%  of the GDP in 1994.  Then, after consolidating  the pension system
deficit  of the  public  sector  with  individual  social  security  saving,  he  concludes  that  net dis-
saving fell from a maximum of 6.5%  of the GDP in 1982  to 0.6% of the GDP in 1994, which
could  be interpreted  as  evidence  of a positive  effect of the reform  on  social  security  saving.
However,  his  figures  also  show that  in  this period  there  was  a  considerable  effort in  public
saving and also a strong increase in corporate  saving (from 5.4% of GDP in  1980 to  16.4% in
1994).  In  his opinion,  these  factors  largely  explain  the increase  in national saving  during the
period.  He  adds  however that,  in this context,  the  pension  reform,  "because  of its indirect
effect  on  the  development  of the  capital  markets  and  on  the  supply  of  funds  to  finance
investment,  has  a  predominant  place  among  the reforms  that improved  the  environment  in
which saving and investment provide each other with mutual feed-back".
Agosin,  Crespi  and Letelier  (1997)  also  identify  growing  corporate  and  government
saving as the main explanation  for the increase in national saving, but their figures  also  show
that the mandatory  pension savings  in  the AFP  system  grew  constantly from  1981  onwards,
without  this  producing  an  increase  in  voluntary  dissaving  of individuals  during  the  same
period.  This would seem to reflect a positive contribution  - although,  in his words, "not the
most important"  - of the pension system reform on national saving.
Holzmann  (1996)  constructs a "net social security  savings"  measure,  subtracting  from
the savings in the AFP system what he calls the "fiscal cost of the reform", and concludes  that
the direct contribution of the reform on domestic  saving was negative  until 1988.  From that
date  onwards,  on  the  situation  changes  only  because  of  the  high  return  of pension  fund
investments93. He  proceeds  to  compare  this "net  social  security  saving"  with  saving of the
private sector, net of the pension  system ("voluntary  saving of corporations  and individuals")
and with government  saving,  net of the pension deficit,  observing  that after a period  (1980-
1988)  in which  all these  "nete  values  grow  at the  same rate,  both  non-social security  public
saving  and private  saving remain  at practically  constant  levels,  equal  to  10%  of the  national
product each.  In his view,  this evidence would confirm  his econometric results  that show no
direc positive impact of the reform on private  saving.  However, he also reports  that pension
reform,  because  of its  impact on total  factor productivity,  the reform  had a positive  indirect
effect  on  savings,  and  highlights  the  important  contribution  of  the  public  sector  to  the
reported increase in private and domestic saving after the reform.
Other  studies  follow  a  different  approach  and  estimate  econometric  functions  of
private  saving,  specified  in  such  a way  as  to  capture  the  direct  and  indirect  effects  of the
pension  reform.  The results  of these studies  are  also contradictory.  Haindl (1995),  Morand6
(1996)  and  Corsetti-Schmnidt-Hebbel  (1997)  conclude  that  the  reform  contributed  to  an
93  Our own  estimates  show that,  after  the reform,  the  "net  social  security  saving"  decreased  even
more  than  Holzmann  states.  In  fact,  this  magnitude  does  not  become  positive  in  the  whole
estimation  period  (see Table  5).  Neither  do Holzmann's  figures  coincide with  those  of Arrau.
Their  differences  are  explained  by differences  in the  measurement of saving in  the AFP  system
and social security deficit.
37increase in private saving,  especially  because of its positive  effects on the development  of the
capital  market.  Coronado  (1997)  assessed  the  impact  of pension  reform  on  households
savings net of social security  (what we have called "voluntary  individual -or personal-  saving")
and founds that it had a negligible  effect among medium  and low income households  but that
higher income households  "responded to the privatization  of social security by increasing their
overall  net of social security  savings  rates".  Holzmann  (1996)  finds  that there is a negative
relation between  the development  of the capital market and voluntary private saving,  and that
the latter is a good substitute for mandatory saving.
It is  therefore  clear  that in  Chile's  case,  empirical  studies  have  been  insufficient  to
resolve  the  question  of the  impact  of the reform  on  saving.  However,  available  evidence
makes it possible to put forward the following conclusions:
*  Figures  in  National  Accounts  show  a  strong  growth  in  national  saving  in  the  years
following  pension  reform  in  1980.  This  increase  is  explained  mainly  by  increases  in
government  saving and in voluntary private saving (by companies).
*  Although  there  are  certain  contradictory  results, both  the  conceptual  arguments  and  the
greater part of the empirical  evidence  suggests  that the reform to the pension  system has
had  a positive  impact  - though not a very important  one  - on  private voluntary  saving,
both by individuals and companies.
*  Undoubtedly,  the strategy  used by  the  Chilean  Treasury to  finance  the deficit of the  old
pension  system  represents  a  major  cause  of the  expansion  of national  saving  after  the
reform of the pension system.
V.3  Impact on  capital markets
a)  Expected effects
The  accumulation  old  pension  funds  may have  a  positive  impact  on  capital  market
development.  This result is explained by the improvement in  financial market regulations  that
should  follow  pension  reform;  by  the  impulse  to  innovation  that  comes  from  a growing
demand for financial assets; from lower price volatility and in firms cost of capital; and because
of improvements  in the allocation of funds due to the professionalization  and specialization of
the market94.
However,  the positive  impact of pension reform  on capital  market  development  will
not be realized unless  three main conditions  are met:  first, that investment  regulations  do not
limit unnecessarily  options  for pension  funds portfolio  diversification;  second, that there  is a
stable  macroeconomic  environment;  and,  third,  that  there  exist  among  the  authorities  an
adequate  understanding  of the relationships  between  pension  fund  accumulation  and capital
market  development  and,  also,  the political  will  to go  ahead  with  the  necessary  changes  in
capital market laws and regulations  (it is also important to realize that all these effects could be
outbalanced or reinforced by the impact of other circumstances  affecting capital markets).
94  See Iglesias  (1997) and Walker and Lefort (2001).
38In  several  parts  of this  paper  we  have  stressed  that,  in  Chile,  pension  reform  was
accompanied  by other  economic  and  social reforms  which contributed  to  economic  growth
and  macroeconomnic  stability and  which,  in  turn,  helped  to reinforce  the  impact  of pension
reform  on  capital  markets.  Also,  as we will  see, regulators  did use the  push that came  from
pension  fund accumulation  to initiate them,  since almost immediately  after pension reform,  a
process  of change  and  innovation  in  capital  market  laws  and regulations  that has  continued
almost uninterrupted  until present date.
On  the other hand,  because  of widespread  concerns  about the effects  that an under-
developed  capital  market  might  have  on  the  results  of the  new  pension  system,  Chilean
regulators  decided  to  incorporate  a  series  of  particularly  strict  investment  regulations  for
pension  funds,  these  regulations have  been gradually  changed  offering pension funds  greater
possibilities  of portfolio  diversification.  In our  opinion, casual  evidence  shows that pension
fund  investment  regulations  have  been  effective  in  preventing  major  problems  in  fund
management without seriously impairing  capital market development.
In the next  pages, we offer  some  anecdotal  evidence  on the impact  of pension  funds
accumulation on the improvement of capital market regulations  and on capital market size, and
we will sunmmarize  the fndings of the (few) empirical studies on this subject.
b) Improvement  ofregulations
During the  past two  decades,  the  regulation  of the  Chilean  capital  market  has  been
substantially  reformed.  Although  some  of these  changes  date  from before  the beginning  of
operations  of the new pension  system,  the vast majority  were  concurrent with  the growth  of
the pension funds.
In part, the simultaneous  nature of pension  fund growth and the institutional reforms
in the capital market suggests that these advances  were  a direct consequence  of the reform  to
the pension system.  In fact, in some cases, such as the setting up of the risk-rating system for
public-offering instruments and the incorporation  of new regulations on conflicts of interest in
the  Securities  Law,  the  evidence  clearly  supports  this  causal  relationship,  since  the  reforms
were  justified  by  the  need  to  ensure  an  adequate  framework  for  the process  of investing
pension  funds, and they were incorporated into that body of law.
Another  strking aspect  of the  Chilean  experience  is  the  continuity of the process  of
legal  changes during  the 80s and 90s.  This phenomenon  may also be interpreted  as evidence
of  a  close  relationship  between  the  accumulation  of  the  funds  and  the  institutional
transformation of the capital market, since it seems improbable that this same dynamic process
would have  occurred  without  the  constant  pressure  exerted  by the  AFPs and life  insurance
companies  (CSV),  due  to  their  growing  demand  for  financial  assets  and  the  repeated
presentations  to  the  authorities  of  specific  proposals  designed  to  improve  the  regulatory
framework of the pension system and that of the securities market.
39c) Innovation
The  accumulation  of funds  in  the AFPs  and  CSVs,  together with  the need to  create
institutions to  facilitate  the  efficient intermediation  of these resources,  may also have  been  a
considerable force behind  certain innovations in the Chilean  capital market.  One of the most
outstanding  changes was  the creation  of a centralized  electronic  system of securities  custody,
which  began  operating  in  1995  and  which  includes  the  AFPs  and  CSVs  among  its
shareholders.  In addition,  in  1987  the  Santiago  Stock  Exchange  implemented  a  system  of
electronic  trading,  and  in  1990  created  a  new  exchange,  entirely  equipped  with  electronic
trading systems.  Both innovations  can be explained  as a result of the growth in the volume of
transactions, driven by the accumulation of funds in the AFPs and CSVs.  On the other hand,
as we were saying earlier, in 1985 a system of risk rating began to operate,  created specifically
for the pension funds, which later served to give birth to the private risk-rating industry.
In  1989,  special  single  purpose  companies  were  created  to  facilitate  pension  funds
investment in  real  estate.  In  1991,  investment  funds  (close-endfunds) did  come  (for  the  first
time)  to the market;  these funds were formed  to give the pension  funds  a different vehicle to
invest in  the  real-estate  sector  (real-estate  investment  funds),  and also  to  open to them  the
market for  stocks  of companies  whose  securities  are not traded  in  the  stock  exchanges  and
which therefore represented a higher  level of risk (corporate  development investment  funds).
Later, and also aimed to the life insurance companies and pension funds market, the mortgage
"mutuo" was created95.
d) Size of  the market
One of the most striking economic phenomena  of the 1980s in Chile was the growth in
the  size  of the  capital  markets.  Although  many  factors  explain  this  trend,  circumstantial
evidence  suggests that the growing  demand for financial assets from the AFPs and the CSVs
may have  stimulated the  expansion  in the volume  of transactions.  In turn, this  had positive
effects  on market liquidity; trading costs, the supply of long-term  funds, and the cost of capital
for companies.
Possibly the greatest impact of the creation of the pension system has been seen in the
increased  supply  of long-term  funds  and  the  increased  liquidity  of the  stock  market.  The
evolution of the bond market shows the effect of this change.  Thus, the number of companies
with registered bond issues rose  from seven in  1980 to 45 in  1997, and the balance of bonds
issued increased in the same period  from U$44 million to a maximum of U$2.790 million, in
1994.  The mortgage  loan  market  has also  benefited  from  this  structural  change.  The total
stock  of mortgage-backed  securities  and  "mutuos"  rose  from  U$624  million  in  1980  to
U$8.027  million in  1997.  On the other hand, the number of companies with shares  listed on
the  stock  exchange  rose  from  210  in  1982  to  330  in  1997,  and  registered  issues  from  an
95  The "mutuo" represents  a contract between  its holder and the mortgager, without there being any
intermediate institution  (such as the financial institution,  in the case of certificates)  to support the
fulfilling  of the  obligations  accepted  by  the  mortgager.  The  conditions  for  issuing  these
instruments  (amount,  terms,  rates)  are  more  flexible  and  therefore  they  are  less  liquid  than
mortgage-backed  securities  (which are issued in series with similar characteristics).
40average of 34 between  1980-83 to 50 between  1995-97.  After pension funds starting investing
in  the  stock  market,  trading  in  shares  rose  from  U$55  million  in  1984  to  a  maximum  of
U$11.124 million in  1995  (see Table 7).
e) Empirical evidence
The impact of Chile's pension reform  on capital market development  has been subject
of few  empirical  studies.  Since  pension  reform  came  along  with  other  economic  reforms
which  also  had  an  impact  on  capital  markets,  all  of  these  studies  face  the  difficulty  of
separating how much of capital market  development is due to social security  reform and how
much to other independent changes.
Holzmann  (1996)  constructed  a  series  of indicators  to  measure  the  development  of
financial  market  in  Chile96 and  then  investigated  the  relationships  between  these,  the
accumulation  of the pension  funds, the  savings rate  and economic growth.  He finds  that all
the indicators  grew  strongly  after  the crisis  in  the  banking  area  in  1982-83  showing  a  high
correlation  with the  expansion  in the level of assets managed by the AFPs.  For example,  the
stock market shows  a linear  growing trend  since  1985  (the  first year in which the AFPs were
authorized to buy shares) and the correlation between the volume of shares in the hands of the
AFPs, the total number of shares  traded in the market,  and the capitalization  of the market is
also  very  high.  In addition,  using monthly  data,  he  found a  strong correlation  between  the
trading volumes  in different  instruments  and  the level  of the pension  funds.  He  therefore
concluded that all the empirical  evidence pointed towards  maintaining that pension  funds  had
made the financial markets more liquid and mature.
Holzmann also tried to prove whether or not pension  funds had contributed to a more
competitive  capital  market,  which  would  allow  for  better allocation  of risk.  To do  this  he
sought,  and found,  an  inverse  relation  between  the development  of the pension  system  and
indicators  of pricing  failures  in the market  (which measure  the real result of certain  financial
assets,  comparing  them  with  similar  results  obtained  from  a reference  model).  Although  he
warns  that none of these  results in themselves  represent  absolute proof that the AFP  system
has  been  the  main  element  in  explaining  capital  market  development  in  Chile,  he  also
emphasizes that the available empirical evidence is consistent with that idea.
Walker  and  Lefort  (2000)  present  evidence  (which  they  call  "anecdotal;  casuistic;
qualitative;  simple  data;  and econometric")  which  supports  the  idea that pension reform  did
have  a  positive impact  on capital market  development  in  Chile.  Particularly,  they found that
pension reform  did favor the accumulation  of "institutional capital"  (a better legal  framework;
increased  professionalism  in  the  investment  decision-making,  increased  transparency  and
integrity) in the capital market.  They also present some evidence of increased  market liquidity;
lower  securities  price-volatility,  and  lower  transaction  costs,  and  they  point  out  that  the
qualitative  evidence  regarding  the  positive  relationship  between  pension  reform  and  the
creation of new financial instruments was clear.
96  They include  the proportion  of financial  assets  in  the wealth  of the economy;  the proportion  of
financial  assets  in the assets  of financial  institutions; the level of financial  liabilities plus  assets of
institutional investors;  and another series of specific indicators for the stock market.
41Another  study  by  Catalin,  Impavido  and  Musalem  (2000),  analyzed  the  causality
between  contractual  savings  (pension  funds  and  reserves  of  life  and  non-life  insurances
companies)  and  stock  market  development  using  a  sample  of  19  countries  which  includes
Chile.  For Chile's  case  they found that  causality runs  both ways  from contractual  savings to
market  capitalization  and vice-versa;  and  from  contractual  saving  to value  traded  and vice-
versa.  These  results,  in  their  opinion,  may  be  explained  by  pension  fund  investment
regulations which did prohibit, until late 1985 investment in equities.
VI.  UNSOLVED  PROBLEMS OF THE AFP SYSTEM
Some  of the  more  specific  regulations  of the  AFP  system,  even  though  they  were
necessary  in  the  early  days  of the  system,  may  now  have  more  costs  than  benefits.  The
development  of the capital market and of the supervisory  capacity of the different institutions
responsible  for the oversight  of the  financial sector;  the experience  built up by members  and
fund-management  companies  over  these  years;  and  the  improved  quality  of  available
infornation,  have  all  helped  to  create  conditions  that  make it both  possible  and  timely  to
introduce  alternative  forms  of regulatory  design  to ensure  that the  objectives  of the pension
system are fulfilled more efficiently.
The areas in which the costs  of present regulations have  become most evident are the
organization of the industry; the structure of management charges; investments regulations; the
design of pension modalities; and the supervisory model.
VI.1 Organization  of the AFP industry
The trend  towards  industry  concentration  (see  section  IV.7),  is attracting most of the
attention  in  current  public  discussion  regarding  the  AFP  system.  At  least  two  negative
consequences  are attributed to this trend: in the first place, the limited competition in prices to
be observed in the industry and second, distortions in the operation of the local capital market
because  of the  presumed  monopsonistic  power  of pension  funds  in  the  market  for  some
financial  assets as well as relatively weak portfolio  diversification.  Because of these problems,
some  analysts  believe  that  the  trend  towards  industry  concentration  could  weaken  political
support  for  the  pension  system  and motivate  inefficient  forms  of government  intervention
such as the creation of a state-owned AFP that would act as a "price regulator".
a) Causes of concentration
The growing  concentration  in the  AFP industry  results  from various  factors,  mainly
the  economies  of  scale  that  exist  in  the  industry  (whose  effects  are  reinforced  by  limited
product  differentiation)  and  some  regulations  that  prevent  AFPs  from  benefiting  from
economies of scope from their integration with other financial institutions.
i. Economies of  scale
Circumstantial  evidence strongly suggest that there  are important  economies of scale in
the AFP industry, both in  the production of "operational  services"  offered by the AFPs (such
42as  management  of personal  accounts;  collection  of  contributions;  and  recording  of the
movements  in  each  account);  and  in  the  production  of services  related  with  pension  fund
management.
The  cost  advantage  of larger AFPs  which  comes  from  scale  economies,  cannot  be
offset  by  smaller  AFPs  through  better  service  or  product  differentiation,  since  current
regulations  promote product uniformity.  In particular,  prevailing uniformity in pension  fund
portfolios  results  from the use of the  average portfolio of the industry  as the benchmark  for
measuring performance  (see  section VI.3 next).  So AFPs compete either  on price  (a strategy
rarely  observed),  or by their marketing  efforts.  Obviously, whichever  of these  alternatives is
used, lower average operational costs represent a competitive advantage for larger competitors.
ii. Legal barmiers to entC/7
Exclusive corporate  purpose
Regulations  have  given  the AFPs  two  specific  characteristics  that limit  entry  to  the
industry.  On  the  one  hand,  pension  fund  management  companies  must  have  a  single
corporate  purpose  (they can only do what the pension law allows  them to and no-one who is
not an AFP is allowed to offer what the law assigns  exclusively  to these entities).  In addition,
the scope of commercial and operational integration with other financial sector firms is limited.
Although these restrictions  make it easier to supervise and control conflicts of interest,
they-also severely limit the ability of AFP to benefit from scale and scope economies  that may
come  from  joint  production  and  distribution  of activities  like  collection  of  contributions;
account processing; and fund management".
Vandatooy reserve ("encaje"'
As we said in section I.1 .e,  AFPs must hold a Mandatory  Reserve  equal to 1% of the
funds that they manage.  So, for example, in order to achieve a market share equal to 10% of
the  funds,  a new company  entering  the market would have  to constitute  a reserve  of US$37
million, in addition to the capital needed to finance its fixed assets, initial operational expenses
and its marketing effort.  Given the size of accumulated funds, and since the size of the market
is now growing at a rate not substantially greater than the rate of increase  in labor  force, this
restriction  now  represents  a  relevant  barrier  for  any  company  who  looks  for  an  efficient
market size and who must get members of other pension companies to transfer.
97  A legal barrier of entry which is not due to pension fumds regulations but to the banking law is  the
98  prohibition faced by banks to own AFPs as subsidiaries.
Although  most recently  some  of the  restrictions  to  subcontract  services  are being  lifted,  so  far these
changes have not had any mayor effect.
43b)  Future  developments
Due  to recent  changes  in regulations  and  to other  possible  changes  that  are  already
being discussed in the Parliament, it is expected that the organization of the AFP industry will
change  substantially  in the coming  years.  The trend  seems  to be towards the unbunding of
the different activities  that are currently handled by the AFPs.  In particular,  we expect to see
AFPs become more and more  specialized in personal account management,  facing  almost no
competition  from  other  industries  in  the  provision  of this  particular  service,  while  banks,
mutual  funds  and life  insurance  companies  begin  to  compete with  the AFPs in  the  pension
fund management  industry.  At the same time, we expect to see growing competition  between
AFPs and life insurance  companies  in the pensions market.
The  first  sign  of this  trend  is  a  recent  reform  which  authorized  the  AFPs  to  sub-
contract the management of the investment portfolio with specialized asset managers, together
with an authorization  given to banks to form a particular kind of subsidiary  companies whose
purpose is the management of investment portfolios9 9.
A  second  example  is  the  recent  approval  by the  Parliament  (September  2001)  of an
amendment  to  the  pension  law  which  authorize  members  of  the  AFPs  to  choose  freely
between portfolio managers,  other than the AFPs, to manage voluntary  social security savings
(which  benefits  from  special tax  incentives)  under different  investment portfolio  regulations.
Also, and although secondary  regulations  have not yet been issued, it seems that on the basis
of this new law,  tax exemptions  to voluntary  contributions  to personal accounts in the AFPs
will also be extended  to voluntary contributions  to pension plans offered by other institutions
(ike  life  insurance  companies).  These  changes  could  have  three  different  effects:  first,  to
increase competition in the (voluntary) pension fund management  industry; second, to provide
incentives  for pension fund portfolio  diversification; and, third, to encourage  the development
of  the voluntary pension plans industry in Chile, which are currently almost non-existent.
Although voluntary social security contributions are not significant  (currently not more
than  U$  400 million),  these  changes  should help authorities  learn  how to regulate  a pension
fund management industry with more  actors  different  than AFPs  and with different financial
products and,  so, may motivate the preparation  of future  deeper changes  in regulations  of the
mandatory part of the system.  In  fact, some government authorities  have  begun to evaluate
and  discuss  a  deeper  change,  namely  to authorize  AFP  members  to  choose  between  fund-
management  companies  that  are  not AFPs,  so  that these  could  manage  at least part of the
pension fund formed with mandatory contributions'o°.
99  So far, and because of imperfections in the management charges structure that was authorized,
this legal change has not produced any practical consequences.
100  Different  alternatives  are  being  studied.  One  is  to  authorize  other  financial  intermediaries
different  from the AFP  to compete  for mandatory  contributions  paid out of wages over UF  30.
Other  alternative  is  to  split the  contribution  rate  in  two  (e.g.  5%  and  5%);  so  workers  would
contribute  one  part  (5%/O)  to  the  AFPs  (with  regulated  portfolios)  and could  hand  the  other  to
management  institutions  offering less  regulated portfolios.  A third one was  recently presented  by
Arrau  and Vald6s  (2001)  and would  allow workers  to choose between  fund managers  other than
AFPs  to  manage the  part of the  accumulated  balances  in  their personal  accounts which  exceeds
what the authors call "the target pension fund". (Arguments  in favor of opening the pension fund
44Finally,  there  are  some  proposals  to reduce  other  legal barriers  to entry  to  the AFP
industry,  such as  authorizing banks to  form AFPs  as subsidiaries  and  mnake joint use of their
commercial  platform;  and to reduce the mandatory  reserve requirement  ("Encaje")  from  1%
of the funds to 0.5%.
These  changes  should  led  to  greater  portfolio  diversification;  a growing  number  of
different investment vehicles in which pension funds could be invested; and less concentration
of the pension fund industry.  In our opinion,  the new organization  of the industry would help
reduce  the  risk  that  political  support  of the  system  could  weaken  and  could  also  help  to
increase  the  long term rate of return of pension  funds.  However,  these results  will depend
critically on the way in which the new regulation is designed.  For example, greater freedom for
members  to choose  their desired portfolio may led to a substantial increase in  the proportion
of pension  funds which  are in  stocks  and so,  to greater variability in long term returns  than
what  would  be  optimal  for  a mandatory  pension  system where  there are  both  implicit and
explicit  governments  guarantees.  Also, if  not properly  regulated,  the  growing integration  of
the  pension  fund  industry with  other  financial  industries  could result  in  situations  that will
increase  potential  conflicts  of interest  between  managers  and  members  and,  eventuallv,  in
opportunities  for  members  to  evade  the mandate  to  save  for old  age'01. In  short,  although
changes  in the organization  of the industry  are necessary,  the regulations  that will allow these
changes  must be  designed with the utmost care and always  taking into  consideration  the  fact
that this is a mandatory pension system whose only objective is to pay pensions.
VI. 2  Price competition
As explained above,  (see section IV.6)  there is a widespread view that the price level in
the  AFP  industry  is  higher  than  it  should  be.  In  our  opinion,  this  is  not  due  to  the
organization  of the industry but rather  to the lack of incentives  for price competition  among
firms, a  situation  which,  in  turn,  is a result  of the low price elasticity  of the  demand  for the
service  offered  by  the  AFPs  and  of certain  regulations  that  make  their  charge  policy  less
flexible.
Low price  elasticity  of demand is  explained  by  the  characteristics  of the  product and
the high cost of information  to members for finding out the price that they are actually paying,
when  compared  with  the  seemingly  immaterial  differences  in  monthly  charges.  Existing
regulations are partially  responsible for this situation.  For example, fixed charges are deducted
from  the  accumulated  balance  in  the  personal  account  so  that  the  worker  has  no  clear
perception  of its value.  The other charge  is deducted directly from the wage (as a percentage)
but is  retained by the employer, who transfers  the corresponding  amount to the AFPs.  Since
workers  usually compare  only net (after  tax and social  security  contributions)  wages,  they do
not see clearly the differences in prices between AFPs.
management industry to other  financial institutions can be found in Shah, 1997; Iglesias,  1999; and
Arrau and Vald6s, 2001).
101  For example, they could be willing to pay a high pension fund management  fee to a financial
intermediary who offers  to bundle this service with some other financial product whose price is
reduced in compensation.
45On the other hand, present regulations  oblige AFPs to apply uniform, non-negotiable
management  charges  to  their  members.  It  has  been  said  that  this  restriction  affects
commercial  strategies,  gives  rise  to  numerous  cross-subsidies  between  members,  and  has
negative  consequences  on  the  level  of  prices  and  expenses  in  the  system"'2 . First,  the
prohibition  on forming groups  to negotiate management  charges with the AFPs could prevent
amortization of the fixed costs associated with searching for and processing price information
and could also prevent members to benefit from possible savings in AFPs marketing costs, by
comparison  with  the  process  of individual  sales.  Moreover,  prohibitions  on  agreeing  on
different prices, depending  on membership  contracts with minimum duration,  have an impact
on AFPs  pricing policies, because  there are fixed costs associated with sales effort.  Also, since
AFP revenues depend mainly on the percentage charge  on wages and there are certain  services
for which no charges  are made,  each member represents a different profit margin in his or her
AFP.  In particular,  members  with  the highest wages,  with greatest contribution  density, the
youngest, and those who have no voluntary savings or compensation  accounts,  offer a greater
potential economic margin to the AFPs.
Because of all these factors, current AFP pricing policies increase the importance of the
sales forces, since  members  seem to be highly  sensitive to the incentives that agents  may offer
in  order to obtain  a decision  to  switch  from  one AFP to  another.  Also,  sales  agents  are  an
efficient mechanism  to identify  the  groups  of members  whom  the  AFPs  want  to  reach'03.
Until  1997, when  transfers  regulation was  changed,  this meant an increase  in  the number  of
sales agents and in marketing  costs and an almost ever-increasing number of member transfers.
As  a result,  the possible  de-concentration  of the AFP industry would  not necessarily
result in greater price competition.  That objective would require other  changes  in  regulations
of management charges.  However,  the road towards  greater price competition  faces various
obstacles.  In  fact,  the  experience  in  other  countries  that  have  adopted  mandatory  pension
systems managed by private  companies, shows that the price  structure of AFPs has, in all cases
and like in Chile, been strictly regulated, whatever the competitive conditions in the respective
industries.  The aims of these regulation - rarely stated explicitly - seem to be the following:
*  To  ensure  that  the  price  structure  is  simple  and  transparent,  so  that  the  costs  of price
information shall be as low as possible for the members.
*  To ensure  a price structure that is easy to administer.  In particular, to avoid a process  for
calculating  and  declaring  social  security  contributions  that  is  very  complicated  for
employers.
*  To allow the price structure to adapt to the costs structure of the AFPs.
*  To subsidize workers with lower wages, pensioners  and other members who, according to
the regulator and for different  reasons, should not be charged the cost of the services they
receive.
Some of these  objectives  are  mutually  incompatible.  For example,  if the AFPs were
able to differentiate the percentage  charge on the wage for different members,  this could mean
raising the  price  for low income  members  and reducing  the  price paid by the members with
102  See Valdes (1995 and  1997).
103  See Valdes  (1997).
46highest wages,  which  is  contrary  to public  policy objectives.  Also, it has  been  argued  that,
because of the economies of scale existing in the industry and since the product is very similar,
legal changes  that would serve  to accentuate  price competition would inevitably  speed up the
trend towards concentration  of the industry in few AFPs.
Finally, there are also problems associated with the transition from one price scheme to
another.  For  example,  if  AFPs  are  authorized  to  charge  different  prices  depending  on
members  commitments  to  stay for some minimum  period, there could be an important one-
off increase  in marketing  costs,  since the AFPs would have  to negotiate  contracts with  each
and every one of their members  in order to maintain their market share.
Therefore,  it  is  not  easy  to  solve  the  problem  of  conflict  of objectives  in  price
regulation, and it seems even more difficult to modify AFPs price  structure once the industry
has  developed  and  companies  have  made  large  investments  in  building  their  respective
competitive  fortresses,  since  any  change  will  produce  an  inevitable  redistribution  across
companies.
VI.3 Investment regulations
Pension  fund investments  are  strictly regulated  (see  section  II.1.d).  Only  AFPs  can
provide  pension  fund  management  services.  Investments  can  be made  only  in authorized
assets and following very strict portfolio diversification  rules.  Each AFP can manage only two
pension  funds  and must guarantee  a  minimum  return  for  the  investments.  In  our  opinion,
these  rules  create  at least  two  problems;  in the  first  place  they prevent  adequate  portfolio
diversification;  second, they limit portfolio choice available to members.
a)  Portfolio diversification
Although we have not made any attempt to define the "efficient frontier"  for adequate
portfolio diversification,  circumstantial  evidence  leads us to the opinion that current portfolios
are  too  concentrated  in  government  securities  (Central  Bank  debt)  and  that the  maximum
limits  for  foreign  investrnents  and  investments  in  stocks  (including  mutual  and  closed-end
investments  funds) are too low.
The costs of inadequate  portfolio diversification  have been abundantly  documented  in
the  financial  literature  and  its  not necessary  to  stress  their  importance.  However,  in  the
context of a mandatory and funded pension system, this situation has potential impact over the
public budget and over the political risks faced by the system.  In particular,  a lower long term
rate  of return  could  mean  both  greater  than  expected  government  expenses  in  minimum
pensions  and that  political support of the system  weakens.  There  is also  a different  kind  of
political risk due to the concentration of investments in public debt since government is in the
position of being, at the same time, debtor and regulator of pension funds.
47b) Portfolio diferentiaion
The  observed  uniformity  of portfolios  across  pension  funds  is,  at least  in  part, the
result of existing regulations.  In particular,  since for most of their existence AFPs have been
authorized to manage only one fund (the authorization to manage a second fund is very recent)
and  the minimum  return requirement  is measured  relative  to  aggregate  pension  fund return,
there is only one benchmark  (the average  portfolio)  against which  all pension fund managers
evaluate their own performance.  The absence of other benchmarks  generates  a "herd effect"
towards the average portfolio  which limits portfolio differentiation.  In other words,  currently
it is  too  "risky"  for  any  AFP  to  structure  a  portfolio  that is  significantly  different  from  its
competitors  because experience  has shown that they will be very efficient in taking commercial
advantage  of  this  situation;  in  fact,  there  is  evidence  showing  that  transfers  of members
between AFPs depend on relative rates  of return of pension funds, measured in the very short
term.
Although  its evident that portfolio uniformity reduces  information  costs for members
(most of them are very unsophisticated investors) and facilitates  the supervision of the pension
system, it also causes  several problems.  For example, it increases the sensitivity of members to
sales pitches  and to the incentives  offered  by sales  personnel in  order to  obtain a transfer to
another  fund-management  company.  This  situation  would  raise  marketing  costs  since  the
expected length of stay of each member in a single AFP is reduced, compared to a situation in
which each fund-management company could offer one or more differentiated portfolios.
It  also  obliges  members  to  choose  between  very  similar  portfolios  which  are  not
necessarily  in line with  their individual  preferences.  The most obvious  case  is that of young
members  who may have  a stronger preference  for portfolios made up of a higher proportion
of stocks,  and that of older members, close to retiring age, who want to buy a life annuity and
have a  strong  preference  for  stability in  the value of the  accumulated funds  in their personal
accounts.
Finally, if AFP members  cannot choose between  differentiated  portfolios, the political
risk faced by the system will increase.  For example, with greater portfolio differentiation  there
would be  less  probability  that at a particular  moment  all  funds  will  have  poor results,  so it
would be more difficult  for any member of the  system to claim  that the system offers no real
possibilities of choice, in order to try and obtain some compensation at government's expense.
c) Future developments
As  mentioned  earlier,  the  Parliament  recently  approved  a  new  law  that  opens  the
market of voluntary pension funds management to financial intermediaries  other than AFPs'04
and  gives  workers  freedom  to choose  between  different  investment  vehicles  when  deciding
how to invest their voluntary pension savings.  The Parliament is also discussing other changes
to pension  fund investment  regulations  that will loosen investment Limits  and allow AFPs to
manage  five different pension  funds, each one of them with its own investment limits.  In the
104  An  increase  in  the number  of fund-management  companies,  if it is  not accompanied  by other
changes in regulation,  will have only a limited impact on portfolio differentiation.
48future,  these  reforms  could  be  complemented  with  the  elimination  (or  relaxation)  of the
minimum return requirement  and eventually with an authorization  to members  to buy, out of
their mandatory  contributions, less regulated pension plans.
These  changes  should  led  to  an  increase  in  the  number  of institutions  managing
pension funds and to more  diversified  and differentiated  portfolios'l5. However they will also
generate new challenges  for the regulators and, consequently,  need to be carefully designed.  In
particular, greater portfolio differentiation  comes together with increased information costs  for
members;  greater  variance  in long  term  investment  returns  in  those  funds  which  are  more
heavily invested in stocks; and, potentially, greater marketing costs and fees.
VI. 4 Pension design
The  design  of pension  modalities  and the  operation  of different  pension  markets  is
attracting an increasing amount of attention.  Eventually,  this is explained by the rapid increase
in  the  number  of pensioners  in the  AFP  system,  together  with growing  concern  about  the
probable  increase  of government  expenditure  on  minimum  pensions  and  on  the marketing
costs  of life  annuities.  The  debate  has  centered  around  the  characteristics  of  scheduled
withdrawals  and the intermediation  of life annuities.
a) Scheduled withdrawals
Scheduled  withdrawals  have two  characteristics  that, in the opinion  of many,  are not
appropriate  in  a mandatory  pension  system.  First,  their  expected  value  decreases  over  time
(since each  year life  expectancy  of the pensioner  decreases  less  than the estimated  fall in the
accumulated  pension  fund).  Second,  the  effective value of the pension will change  from one
vear to another, depending on pension fund returns.
Eventually,  the  high returns of the pension  funds during the early years  in which  the
AFP system was operating,  together with the limited experience of the new pensioners,  helped
generated  a situation in which there was little interest in scheduled withdrawals.  However, the
negative returns of 1995 and 1998 have served to draw attention  to these problems.
On  the  other  hand,  and possibly  because  of the  increase  in  the  real  value  of the
minimum guaranteed pension, debate has also begun to arise because of the effects that events
such  as  the  increase  in  the  participation  of women  in  the  workforce,  relatively  prolonged
unemployment  cycles,  and  falls  in the  levels  of long-term  rates  of return  of pension  funds
mright produce on the cost of  the minimum pension prograrn which,  as we have said, benefits
mainly those pensioners under scheduled withdrawal.
To solve these problems  (or to limit their negative consequences),  the introduction of a
new  pension  mode,  called  "variable  lifetime  monthly  payments",  has been  proposed.  This
pension  would make it possible to remove the "longevity risk" from scheduled withdrawals  by
105  As the system matures and the number of pensioners increases,  there will be natural trend towards
de-concentration  of portfolios  at aggregate  level,  even if the number of AFPs  does  not change,
due to the growth in the reserves  of the life insurance companies.
49means  of a collective  longevity  insurance  that would cover the universe  of pensioners  under
this  pension  modality106. More  recently,  a  discussion  has  begun regarding  the  possibility  of
forcing  all pensioners  who  select  a  scheduled  withdrawal  to switch  to a life  annuity  at some
specific  age  or,  as  an alternative,  to replace  the  scheduled  withdrawal  mode  by  a  "standard
deferred  annuity",  which  would  combine  a  scheduled  withdrawal  (estimated  with  no  life
expectancy  risk) to be received until certain age with a life annuity to be received from that age
until death.  As a more radical alternative,  and following  the experience  of some  new pension
systems  in  Eastern  Europe,  some analysts  have  propose  to  eliminate  scheduled  withdrawal
forcing all pensioners  to buy  a life annuity.  Also, there is the idea of authorizing life insurance
companies  to sell anticipated life annuities to members of the pension system which will allow
them to "lock in"  the benefit of periods of high investment return 1 07.
b) Life annwties
As  mentioned  in  section  IV.2,  the  intermediation  costs  of life  annuities  have  risen
during the past ten years.  Whilst in  1989,  the average  fee paid  to life  annuity intermediaries
was  1.56%  of the  premiums,  in 2000  this  figure  had risen  to 5,9%.  This  problem  may  be
explained by the combination of two, independent  factors:
First, for most pensioners, information  costs about the characteristics  of each  pension
modality  are  significant  and  so  a  high  proportion  of consumers  do  not have  good-quality
information  when the moment comes  to buy a pension.  Also, due to regulatory  restrictions,
information regarding those who are about to retire is not public knowledge, and this has given
nse to a "black market"  for such information,  this price being paid by the intermediary.
Second,  at  retirement,  pensioners  seem  to  have  a  strong  preference  to  take  their
accumulated  capital as  a lump sum rather than as a pension.  As it turns out, pensioners buying
life  annuities can get a lump sum by sharing with the life annuity intermediary  the fee that he
receives  from the life insurance company and which is financed with the premium paid by the
108
pensioner
Existing  regulations  allow  members  to withdraw  at  retirement  as  a  lump  sum  the
difference between the actual balance in their personal accounts  and an estimate  of the capital
needed  to  finance  a  pension  equivalent  to  70%  of their average  wage  over  the  previous  10
years and to 120% of minimum pension.  However,  those members not entitled to this benefit
have "discovered"  (with the help of life annuities intermediaries) that they can also get a lump
sum if they buy life annuities and ask the intermediaries  to share  the fee that they receive from
the life insurance companies.  Since  this fee is being financed  out of the premium paid by the
pensioner  to  the  life  insurance  company,  and  this  premium  is  in  fact  the  balance  of the
individuals personal account,  at the end what happens is that the pensioner is "using"  the life
annuity intermediary as a mechanism to take part of his capital as a lump sum.
106  See Edwards and Diaz (2000)  and Valdes  and Edwards  (1998).
107  There are also proposals to modify the formula for calculating the interest rate used for calculating
the scheduled withdrawals.  See Diaz and Valdes  (1992) and Edwards and Diaz  (2000).
108  See Echefiique (1998).
50The amount  that members  can  obtain  via  this  mechanism  is  limited  since  there  are
some regulations that set a minimum level for the life annuity that can be bought.  In the case
of members  who are  retiring  for reasons of old age,  life annuities  cannot  be lower  than the
minimum  pension.  Members who  are taking  early retirement and want to buy  a life  annuity
must finance  a pension  equal to at least  110%  of the minimum pension  and  50%  of average
wage  over  the  previous  10  years  (in  other  words,  20  percentage  points  less  than  the
requirement  for withdrawing  surplus).  However,  once  the  member is retired,  the minimum
level required by regulations  to purchase a life annuity is  equal to the minimum pension.  So,
this last provision opens a loophole that has been used by many "well informed" members  of
the system to obtain  the maximum  amount of the lump  sum.  This  is done by retiring  early
under  the  scheduled  withdrawal  mode  (for  which  pensioners  have  to  fulfil  the  same
requirements  listed  above)  and,  afterwards,  switching  to  a  life  annuity  not greater  than  the
minimum pension.  Then,  all the  difference  between the capital  necessary  to  finance  such an
annuity and the actual balance in the individual personal account, could be "transformed" into
an intermediation fee that then will be "shared" with the pensioner.
It is likely then, that the observed increase in life annuities  intermediation  fees reflects,
at least in part, a growth in the lump sum that pensioners receive directly from the broker.  Of
course,  this result is contrary  to the objectives  of a mandatory pension system since implies  a
fall in the amount of pension received.  However,  and although  this behavior is not legal, it is
very  difficult  to  control  since  all  the  parts  involved  in  the  transactions  (the  pensioner;  the
broker; and the life insurance company) have an interest in making it happen.
To  solve  the  problem  different proposals  for changes  in the law  are  being analyzed.
One  alternative,  proposed by the government  and which was discussed in the Parliament  for
over seven years, is to establish a marketing mechanisms  for life annuities based on "electronic
auctioning"  and compel members  to choose between  the best three  offers  received  through
this mechanism.  However,  recently  (August  2001)  this project was repealed since the  Chilean
Constitutional  Tribunal ruled  that  parts  of the  draft  law were  contrary to members  property
rights  over  the  accumulated  balances  in  their  personal  accounts.  Other  proposals  include:
changes  in  the  regulations  so  to  establish  the  same  requirements  for  early  retirement  and
withdrawal  of funds  as  lump  sums  from  the  personal  account;  changes  in  the  conditions
required  for  switching  from programmed  withdrawals  to life  annuities;  and improvement  in
the  information  received  by members with regard  to the conditions  involved  in  the various
pension  altematives.  In  any  case,  the  insurance  industry  has  responded  to  the  political
pressures  to solve this problem  by agreeing  on some self-regulation  measures.  Although the
medium and long term effects of these measures  are questionable,  so far they have resulted in
a reduction in commissions  for intermediation  to average levels of 3.27% in July 2001.
IV.5 Supervision  model
The growing intemational  diversification  of the portfolio, together with the possibility
of  greater  freedom  of  individual  choice  between  different  portfolios  and  the  expected
increased  integration  of the AFP  industry  with  other  industries  in  the  financial  sector,  will
present challenges  for the supervisor of the pension  system that will put the present model of
specialized  supervision  to  a  test.  In  our  opinion,  and  even  though  there  are  powerful
arguments in  favour of specialization  in the supervision  of a mandatory pension  system, these
51new  trends  make  it  advisable  to  consider,  at  least,  the  possibility  of  carrying  out  joint
supervision, co-ordinated with the supervisory authorities of the banking and securities sectors,
in matters concerning the investment process of the pension funds.
In fact,  the government  has  begun  studies  to set up  a new supervisory  model for the
capital market,  the insurance industry, the banking sector and the AFP system, which would be
organized around the figure of a "leading supervisor", who would co-ordinate the work of the
specialized supervisory institutions in each sector.
VII.  FINAL COMMENTS
The  crisis of the old Chilean pension  system was due mainly to a combination of bad
management  and  political  manipulation  of social  security  programs,  and  not  so  much  to
demographic  trends  ("population  aging").  This  fact  has affected  the whole  pension  reform
process and explains many of the specific design  characteristics of the new system, which were
chosen  in  order  to prevent pension  contributions  from  being  used  for purposes  other  than
that of financing pensions.  The AFP system has undoubtedly  been  extraordinarily  successful
in  achieving  this  objective.  The  combination  of  ownership  rights  over  the  accumulated
balances  in personal accounts,  private management of funds, and freedom of individual choice
has  proved to be  an effective  instrument in protecting  pension  funds from political risk.  The
new pension  system has also been successful in improving the quality of benefits  and services
received  by  the  population,  as  compared  with  the  old  system,  and  by  encouraging  the
development of the capital market.
However, current regulations  may be responsible of the trend toward concentration  of
the AFP industry.  They also  encourage  forms of competition  that may not necessarily  be the
best from the social point of view.  They also limit the value added that AFPs can give to the
services  that they offer  and they limit members'  choice  more than necessary.  None of these
costs  were  apparent when  the  system  began its  operation  and because  of the  circumstances
that prevailed  at that time,  it was necessary  to give  priority  to very  simple  design  forms that
would guarantee  the viability  of the reform, over and above any other consideration.  But the
greater  expenience  accumulated  since  1981,  and the  significant  development  of the AFPs and
the  markets  in this  period,  plus improved  supervisory  ability  and techniques,  now open up
opportunities  for  developing  different  regulations,  without  compromising  the  objectives  of
pension reform.
We  have  stated  that,  in  order  to  fine-tune  the  AFP  system,  it  is  necessary  to
differentiate portfolios  and grant members more opportunities  for choice and to set up a more
flexible fee structure.  The new regulation  model outlined for  the future would lead to radical
changes in the organization  of the pension industry.  In fact, if the set of changes that we have
mentioned  were  to  be  approved,  present  AFP industry  would  be  split  into  three  different
industries:  one, specialized in the operational services needed to manage personal accounts  and
in which,  because of scale economies  and possibilities to differentiate  the products,  only a  few
firms will participate;  another made up of a larger number of companies  specialized  in  fund-
management,  which would offer more diversified portfolios and financial consultancy  services;
and a third, new industry of voluntary pension plans where many firms would participate.
52The  speed  with  which  the  AFP  system  will  move  in  this  direction  will  depend  on
political  discussions.  Today  there  are  two  opposing  positions:  those  who  ask  for  greater
involvement  of the  State in the  pension system,  especially  to increase  control over prices and
investment  policies;  and  those  who  are  seeking  to  take  the  1980  reform  even  deeper  and
promote  changes  that  imply  greater  degrees  of  freedom  for  individual  decision  and  the
opening of pension fund management to other financial companies other than the AFPs.
Whatever  the  more precise  characteristics  of future  changes  may be, we  believe  that
there is a  set of four fundamental and "inseparable"  characteristics  of the pension  system that
should be maintained.  These include the institutions of funded personal accounts; private and
competitive  compamnes  managing  the funds;  members'  freedom  to  select portfolio  manager
and  among  different  pension  modalities;  and  a  benefit  structure  that  is  linked  to  each
individual personal saving effort.  Ensuring the greatest possible independence  of the pension
system from political and economic cycles continues to be an objective of prime importance m
Chile and this protection is a result of the joint effect of all these design characteristics and not
of any  one of them in particular.  In consequence,  the improvements  to the AFP system that
may be necessary in the future should ensure that this set of basic elements is preserved intact.
There  is as  yet no  consensus  regarding future  changes  in specific  areas.  As we have
already  observed,  current  regulations  have  many  advantages  in  terms  of  simplicity,
transparency  and  ease  of  supervision,  and  an  alternative  design  should  not  sacrifice  these
strengths.  Moreover,  the  AFP  system  is  managed  by companies  which  are  already  mature,
which have  large amounts  of capital  tied up in their operation  and for which adaptation  to a
situation  with new rules  could imply  considerable  economic  costs.  Therefore,  the design  of
the transition from the present  situation to an improved  system is  a matter that demands  the
same amount of care  as the design of the solutions  themselves.  It is possible  that the gradual
introduction  of changes  will be a necessary  condition  for any strategy which seeks to improve
the operation  of the present Chilean pension system.
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58Table #1
Maximum  Investment  Limits per Instrument
(percentages  of the pension funds)
Instrument  May'  1981  Sep'  1985  Dec' 1989  Dec'  1990  Dec' 2000
a.  Treasury Notes  No limit  50  50  45  50
b.  Time deposits and other securities representing
deposits or guaranteed  by financial institutions  b+c =70  40  40  50  50
c.  Credit letters issued by financial institutions  80  80  80  50
d.  Public or private company bonds  60  40  40  50  45
e.  Commercial  papers  0  0  0  10  10
f.  Shares of open corporations  0  0  30  30  40
g.  Units of common stock investment funds ()  0  0  0  n.a.  g+h+i=25
h.  Units of real-estate investment funds (*)  0  0  0  g+h+i=10
i.  Units of risk-capital investment funds (*)  0  0  0  n.a.
j.  Units of securitized  loan  investment funds  0  0  0  0  2
k.  Foreing  investment  0  0  0  10  16
i.  Other public offering  instruments authorized
by the Central Bank  0  0  0  0  1
m.  Financial risk hedging operations  0  0  0  0  20
n.  Units of other pension funds  20  20  20  20  0
n.a. =  not applicable because there is a joint limit
(*) Close-end investment funds
Source: Prepared  by the authorsTable #3
Chile's Social Security Programs and Organization
Managing  entities
Private  Publics
Benefit  AFP (1)  Isapres (2)  CCAF  (3)  Mutualidades  INP (4)  CAPREDENA  and  Health  FONASA (6)
.__  _ _  _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _  _______  _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _  D  IPR  EC A  Services
- Common  Disability  X  X  X
- Disability for labor accidents
and professional illness  X  X  X
Pensions  - Old age  X  X  X
- Survivorship  X  X  X
- Minimum  Pension  X  X
-Welfare Pension  X
- Prevention and treatments  X  X  X  X
Health  - Illness allowance  X  X  X  X
- Labor accidents and professional
illness allowance  X  X  X
- Family Allowance  X  X
Family  - Maternity Subsidy  X  X
Allowances  - Small children illness  X  _  X
-O  ther  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  X  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _
Unemployment  Unemployment Subsidy  X  X
Source: Prepared by the authors based on CIEDESS  (1994)Table #4
Minimum  Pension,  Minimum  Wage and Average Wage
(in dollars as of December 2000)
Avegare Wage  Average
Year  Mimimum  for  Minimum  Welfare  (3)  / (1)  (3)  / (4)
Wage  Contribution  Pension  Pensions
Purposes
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
1981  158.3  - 93.7  46.6  0.6  2.0
1982  131.1  397  88.9  44.2  0.7  2.0
1983  111.8  342  84.6  42.1  0.8  2.0
1984  90.9  311  95.0  47.2  1.0  2.0
1985  101.2  284  77.0  38.3  0.8  2.0
1986  94.9  316  81.6  37.3  0.9  2.2
1987  87.5  297  78.2  33.4  0.9  2.3
1988  96.5  322  80.4  40.0  0.8  2.0
1989  101.6  359  84.7  37.5  0.8  2.3
1990  115.2  379  92.5  37.5  0.8  2.5
1991  123.3  389  103.7  43.9  0.8  2.4
1992  127.9  413  105.9  46.3  0.8  2.3
1993  135.8  448  105.8  42.9  0.8  2.5
1994  141.4  473  105.7  45.1  0.7  2.3
1995  147.6  502  116.3  46.7  0.8  2.5
1996  153.9  524  116.2  49.8  0.8  2.3
1997  158.2  549  121.9  50.1  0.8  2.4
1998  170.4  551  121.5  56.9  0.7  2.1
For those  under 70 years of age
Source:  Arenas  y Marcel  (1999),  for  pension  and  minimum  wage  figures.  For  other figures,  the  Statistical
Bulletin of the Superintendency of AFPs (the  December figures for each year).Table #5
Chile: Evolution  of the Social Security Deficit
(%  of GDP)
Years  1981  1982  1983  1984  1986  |1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1996  1996  1997  1998
(1) Transitory Social Security Deficit a/  3.9  8.1  7.6  7.7  6.7  6.3  5.4  5.2  4.6  4.6  4.5  4.4  4.5  4.4  4.2  3.6  3.6  3.6
- Operational deficit  3.9  8.0  7.4  7.5  6.5  6.0  5.0  4.8  4.2  4.1  4.0  3.9  3.9  3.8  3.5  2.9  2.8  2.7
- Recognition Bonds  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.s  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.9
(2) Permanent Social Security Deficit a/  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3
- Welfare pensions  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3
- Minimum pensions  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
(3)  Total Social Security Deficit [(1)+(2))  4.1  8.4  8.0  8.2  7.2  6.8  5.9  5.6  4.9  5.0  4.8  4.7  4.8  4.7  4.5  3.9  3.9  3.9
Memo:
*  AFP  System Saving  n.d.  1.9  1.8  1.9  1.9  2.1  2.1  2.5  2.8  3.1  3.7  3.4  0.4  3.9  4.0  3.3  3.1  n.d.
- Contributions  n.d.  1.7  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.6  1.5  1.8  2.0  2  2  2.5  2.1  0.2  2.0  2.1  1.4  1.2  n.d.
- Yield  n.d.  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.7  1.0  1.3  1.4  0.2  1.9  1.9  1.9  2.0  n.d.
* (AFP Saving - Transitory deficit]  n.d.  -6.2  -5.8  -5.9  -4.8  -4.2  -3.3  -2.7  -1.9  -1.5  -0.7  -1.0  -4.1  -0.5  -0.2  -0.3  -0.5  n.d.
*  AFP Contributions/
Transitory  Social Security Deficit  n.d.  23.2  23.3  24.2  28.5  33.1  39.5  48.0  59.9  67.8  83.7  78.3  8.3  87.6  94.8  90.5  87.4  n.d.
* Net fiscal Social Security surplus  8.2  5.7  5.6  7.0  7.6  8.1  8.9  7.9  7.9  7.5  8.5  9.6  9.7  9.6  9.9  9.8  9.5  8.1
a/ Does not include Armed  Forces  progamme
Source: Compiled by the authors on the basis of information  from PrimAm6rica  (1999)  for savings figures for the AFP System; Arenas and Marcel  (1999) for the figures on Transitory Social Security
Deficit,  Permanent  Social Security Deficit and  Fiscal Surplus; Central Bank for GDP figuresTable #6
Estimates  of Future Social Security Deficit
(%  GDP)
Operational  Recognition  Transitory  Mean tested  Minimum  Long Term  Total Social
Deficit  Bonds  Deficit  welfare  Pensions  Deficit  Security
pensions  Deficit
(1)  (2)  (3)  (1) + (2)  (4)  (5)  (6) =(4) + (5)  (7) =(3) + (6)
1999  2.2%  0.9%  3.1%  0.4%  0.1%  0.5%  3.6%
2000  2.1%  1.0%  3.1%  0.4%  0.1%  0.5%  3.6%
2001  2.0%  1.1%  3.1%  0.4%  0.1%  0.5%  3.6%
2002  2.0%  1.1%  3.1%  0.4%  0.1%  0.5%  3.6%
2003  1.9%  1.1%  3.0%  0.4%  0.1%  0.5%  3.5%
2004  1.8%  1.1%  2.9%  0.4%  0.2%  0.6%  3.5%
2005  1.7%  1.2%  2.9%  0.4%  0.2%  0.6%  3.5%
2006  1.6%  1.2%  2.8%  0.4%  0.2%  0.6%  3.4%
2007  1.6%  1.2%  2.8%  0.4%  0.2%  0.6%  3.4%
2008  1.5%  1.2%  2.7%  0.4%  0.3%  0.7%  3.4%
2009  1.4%  1.1%  2.5%  0.4%  0.3%  0.7%  3.2%
2010  1.3%  1.1%  2.4%  0.4%  0.3%  0.7%  3.1%
Source:  Arenas y Marcel  (1999).Table #7
Chile: Development of the Capital Market
Value of Financial Assets  Value of Financial Assets  Companies with  Issues registered
(Mill. US  2000)  (Mill. U$. 2000)  listed securities  per year (2)
Debt  Shares ("  Debt  Shares  Debt  Shares  Debt  Shares
Total  Bonds  M.B.S.  Others
1980  1,990  44  624  1,322  8,095  N.D.  N.D.  7  263  4  39
1981  2,401  76  1,241  1,085  5,544  1,222  293  7  241  13  37
1982  2,777  352  1.404  1,021  5,388  3,360  137  12  210  9  26
1983  4,403  352  1,532  2,519  3,087  2,057  69  13  211  2  18
1984  5,006  361  1,748  2,896  2,977  1,926  55  15  208  5  10
1985  5,564  395  1,804  3,365  3,227  4,860  79  16  215  3  29
1986  5,959  335  1,861  3,763  6,181  11,003  448  8  215  3  26
1987  6,658  589  1,771  4,299  7,598  15,837  721  14  211  93  33
1988  8,242  959  1,883  5,400  9,356  25,208  869  19  203  12  22
1989  9,628  1,459  2,030  6,139  12.612  35,009  1,125  23  213  10  21
1990  12,962  1,859  2,205  8,898  16,147  67,789  1,044  27  216  16  23
1991  16,314  2,405  2,551  11,358  31,056  75,684  2,529  37  223  19  32
1992  18,256  2,421  2,917  12,918  29,773  78,548  2,835  39  244  12  31
1993  19,246  2,536  3,471  13,239  45,020  137,787  4,083  40  263  5  39
1994  22,248  2,790  4,596  14,862  58,759  177,530  6,380  46  277  14  47
1995  24,135  2,556  5,831  15,748  57,541  254,985  11,124  46  282  6  47
1996  26,556  2,412  7,024  17,120  52,106  306,793  9,326  47  289  5  51
1997  29,034  1,873  8,027  19,134  55,165  353,691  7,627  45  330  7  51
(1)  Does not include  Mutual Funds
(2) A company may register  more than one issue per year
Source: Compiled  by the authors with information  from the Superintendency of Securities and Insurance.Social  Protection Discussion  Paper Series
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The aim of this paper is to describe the  1980 Chilean pension  reform  and to
present  its main results and economic  impact.  It is  mainly descriptive; however
we have tried to emphasize the lessons that may  be learned and that may be
of interest to  other countries  in  different circumstances.  In particular, we
focus on  potential areas for  regulatory  improvements.  In Section II, a brief
description of the AFP  system and its place within Chile s social security
system  is presented.  Also, the main  characteristics of the transition  from the
"old"  to the new  system are sketched, together with the  main changes in
regulation after  1980. Section  III  includes a history of pension reform  in Chile
along with an  analysis of the circumstances which  may explain why the
country decided to introduce such a radical reform.  In  Section  IV, the
performance of the AFP system is  summarized.  In Section V, the main economic
effects of pension reform  are discussed.  Section VI presents  our view regarding
future development in the regulation of the AFP  system. The paper concludes
with  some comments  on the timing of possible regulatory changes.
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